行業論文，關於Internet的套用研究。
基本介紹
- 中文名：基於Internet的供應鏈系統多渠道競爭研究
- 類型：主體
- 特點：不僅使顧客的購物變得簡捷
- 影響：廠商競爭的一個重要因素
中文摘要,外文摘要,
中文摘要
Internet線上直銷渠道不僅使顧客的購物變得更加簡捷，同時也是影響廠商競爭的一個重要因素，是電子商務的一個重要特徵。Internet技術的發展和電子商務的廣泛套用，使得顧客與公司之間的渠道多樣化，顧客溝通渠道的多樣化給公司如何綜合有效利用這些渠道提出了挑戰，為了在電子商務的浪潮中占有一席之地甚而成為自己的競爭優勢，對一個廠商而言，如何設計和最佳化管理這些渠道成為關鍵。 論文就是在上述背景下所展開的研究，主要運用Hotelling模型(Salop's 1979模型)和博弈論理論，探討Internet線上直銷渠道存在的環境下，零售商以及製造商...>> 詳細
Internet線上直銷渠道不僅使顧客的購物變得更加簡捷，同時也是影響廠商競爭的一個重要因素，是電子商務的一個重要特徵。Internet技術的發展和電子商務的廣泛套用，使得顧客與公司之間的渠道多樣化，顧客溝通渠道的多樣化給公司如何綜合有效利用這些渠道提出了挑戰，為了在電子商務的浪潮中占有一席之地甚而成為自己的競爭優勢，對一個廠商而言，如何設計和最佳化管理這些渠道成為關鍵。 論文就是在上述背景下所展開的研究，主要運用Hotelling模型(Salop's 1979模型)和博弈論理論，探討Internet線上直銷渠道存在的環境下，零售商以及製造商零售商系統渠道管理和多渠道定價問題。論文首先對傳統零售商與以Internet線上銷售為唯一渠道的E零售商之間的採購競爭進行了分析，分別探討其Nash均衡競爭和Stackelberg均衡競爭情況以及兩者的進入順序博弈。然後重點對零售商和製造商如何應對和利用Internet線上渠道進行了分析。對零售商之間的競爭而言，在位零售商面對潛在E零售商的進入，探討了在位零售商導入線上渠道的條件以及多渠道管理方式(聯合運營和獨立運營)如何影響在位零售商的Internet線上渠道導入決策。對製造商主導的兩階段系統而言，考慮在儘量避免渠道衝突策略條件下，探討製造商在三種等價策略(批發價保持不變策略，零售價保持不變策略和極大化製造商利潤策略)時的供應鏈整體利潤以及製造商和零售商的各自利潤情況。分析表明，保持零售價相等且極大化製造商利潤的策略通常不僅是製造商的最優策略，也是傳統零售商的較優選擇。然後放鬆渠道零售價格相等的約束，探討當Internet線上渠道與傳統渠道之間價格無任何限制時，製造商和零售商在Bertrand和Stackelberg競爭模式下各自的利潤、零售價以及製造商的最優批發價。接著，對製造商和零售商都可以進行渠道擴張的情況，分析零售商在面對製造商導入線上渠道的潛在威脅時，零售商該如何對渠道擴張進行決策，考慮零售商可線上購買和不可線上購買兩種情況，分別探討製造商和零售商在不同渠道擴張組合情況下各自的利潤和零售價格，得出各自的理性決策，存在一定條件下，製造商和零售商同時選擇擴張渠道使兩者情況都會變好。最後，除了考慮價格對渠道結構及製造商和零售商決策互動的影響，模型中加入了渠道服務質量和顧客對服務質量感知兩個非價格因素，研究渠道服務質量，顧客對服務感知差異以及渠道邊際成本對雙渠道供應鏈的影響，分析上述各因素對雙方均衡利潤以及製造商導入線上渠道決策與否的影響。研究表明，零售商服務質量的提高會提升製造商在雙渠道的利潤。並且，顧客對服務質量靈敏性差異越大，製造商和零售商雙方在均衡處的利潤就會越高。兩渠道邊際成本的差異是決定是否引入Internet線上直銷渠道的關鍵因素，在一定條件下，製造商在雙渠道的情形比在單渠道情形更為有利，即製造商應引入直銷渠道，實施雙渠道運作。 論文利用管理科學、經濟學、運籌學和市場行銷學等交叉學科的理論和方法研究Internet線上渠道下的渠道競爭定價問題，採用理論演繹分析為主的研究方法，將多渠道管理和供應鏈管理相結合進行研究，具有一定的理論創新價值。論文研究屬於管理科學和市場行銷學的前沿領域，也是目前的一個研究熱點。本文研究的成果和結論對我國的零售商和製造商如何合理利用Internet線上渠道將提供一個參考意見，對廠商綜合利用多渠道以增強自身核心競爭力將產生積極影響。 關鍵字：Internet線上渠道；E零售商；供應鏈管理；渠道衝突；多渠道管理；渠道定價
外文摘要
Internet channel not only makes purchasing easier, but also acts as an important factor which affects the competition outcome among firms. Internet channel is also characteristic of Electronic Commerce. With high development of Internet technology and wide spread of electronic commerce application, channels between firms and customers diversitify greatly. Channel diversification has become a challenge for companies how to effectively manage these channels. In order to keep up with the competit...>> 詳細
Internet channel not only makes purchasing easier, but also acts as an important factor which affects the competition outcome among firms. Internet channel is also characteristic of Electronic Commerce. With high development of Internet technology and wide spread of electronic commerce application, channels between firms and customers diversitify greatly. Channel diversification has become a challenge for companies how to effectively manage these channels. In order to keep up with the competition trend even gain a competitive advantage, how to design and manage channel mix is a key for a company to success. The research is done under the background abovementioned, Hotelling model (Salop model) and Game theory are used to discuss competitively pricing problem for multi-channels including Internet channel. Firstly, the thesis considers the procurement game between a traditional retailer and a pure Internet retailer, Nash equilibrium competition and Stackelberg equilibrium competition are analyzed respectively. Secondly, the problem about manufactures and retailers how to utilize Internet channel is considered. For retailers, the condition for incumbent retailer to introduce Internet online channel and how incumbent retailer's multiple channels management style (joint operation management and independent operation management) affects incumbent retailer's decision about online channel introduction are analyzed when incumbent retailer faces E-tailer's entry. For manufactures, under the condition that trying to avoid channel conflict, three kinds of equal-pricing strategy (keeping wholesale price same strategy, keeping retail price same strategy and maximizing manufacturer's profit strategy) are considered to analyze whole supply chain's profit, manufacturer's profit and retailer's profit respectively. The result shows that the strategy which optimizes the manufacture's profit (Strategy 3) also tends to be preferred by the retailer over the other two strategies. The end customer prefers Strategy 3 in most cases too. Then, relaxing the constraint for keeping retail price equal, the profit for manufacturer and retailer, retail price and optimal wholesale price are ananlyzed under Betrand competion and Stackelberg competion between manufacturer and retailer respectively. When a manufacturer introduces on-line channel and a retailer also has option to expand its stores, research conclusion shows that there are conditions under which a retailer strategically stays localized in order to deter a manufacturer from entering the direct market. The manufacturer's direct channel entry always hurts the retailer's profitability. Whereas the manufacturer generally benefits from setting up a direct channel, there exist scenarios under which the manufacturer is strictly worse off with an online store even when its entry cost is negligible. In contrast, both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off with expanded retail stores. Finally, apart from price factor, some non-price elements such as service quality and customers' recognition difference for service quality are also included in the model which consides the dual channel supply chain. The numerical results show that an increase in retailer's service quality may actually increase the manufacturer's profit in dual channel. Moreover, a higher degree of heterogeneity in consumer sensitivity may improve both parties' profits at the equilibrium. The difference in marginal costs of the two channels is a major factor determining the existence of dual channel supply chains. We also show that even if the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, the outcome may still be dual channel equilibrium. In addition, the manufacturer is likely to be better off in the dual channel than in the single channel when the retailer's marginal cost of selling is high and the wholesales price, the consumer valuation and the demand variability are low. Keywords: Internet online channel; E-tailer; Supply chain management; Channel conflict; Multiple channel management;
