《國際關係中的遵約與聲譽》將國家對國際規則的承諾與遵約納入一個兩階段框架之中。
基本介紹
- 中文名：國際關係中的遵約與聲譽
- 外文名：Compliance and reputation in international relations
- 趨勢：法律化、制度化的趨勢
- 模式：基於規則的全球治理模式
- 對象：國家對國際規則
中文摘要,外文摘要,
中文摘要
當代國際事務呈現了越來越明顯的法律化、制度化的趨勢，形成了基於規則的全球治理模式。國家是否遵守國際規則、為何遵守，就成為重要的理論問題和實踐問題。解釋這些問題，對理解國際制度的有效性也有一定的意義。
本文將國家對國際規則的承諾與遵約納入一個兩階段框架之中。承諾是對事後行為的聲明，而遵約是對事前承諾的落實。遵約也就是國家對自我承諾的遵守。本文認為，聲譽機制是有利於國家遵約的重要因素。違約會對聲譽造成負面影響，使本國在他國心目中成為不可信的契約對象，這損害了違約國在未來的可信承諾能力。國家為了在未來收穫更多的合作收益，不得不克服短期的...>> 詳細
本文將國家對國際規則的承諾與遵約納入一個兩階段框架之中。承諾是對事後行為的聲明，而遵約是對事前承諾的落實。遵約也就是國家對自我承諾的遵守。本文認為，聲譽機制是有利於國家遵約的重要因素。違約會對聲譽造成負面影響，使本國在他國心目中成為不可信的契約對象，這損害了違約國在未來的可信承諾能力。國家為了在未來收穫更多的合作收益，不得不克服短期的...>> 詳細
當代國際事務呈現了越來越明顯的法律化、制度化的趨勢，形成了基於規則的全球治理模式。國家是否遵守國際規則、為何遵守，就成為重要的理論問題和實踐問題。解釋這些問題，對理解國際制度的有效性也有一定的意義。
本文將國家對國際規則的承諾與遵約納入一個兩階段框架之中。承諾是對事後行為的聲明，而遵約是對事前承諾的落實。遵約也就是國家對自我承諾的遵守。本文認為，聲譽機制是有利於國家遵約的重要因素。違約會對聲譽造成負面影響，使本國在他國心目中成為不可信的契約對象，這損害了違約國在未來的可信承諾能力。國家為了在未來收穫更多的合作收益，不得不克服短期的違約動機以維繫良好的聲譽。因此聲譽是促使國家遵約的重要機制。
聲譽機制不僅在國家間層面起作用，也可能通過國內聽眾成本而發揮影響。民主遵約論認為，民主國家的公眾更有可能通過選舉槓桿懲罰做出違約決策的政治家，因此民主國家的國際承諾更可信、遵約記錄更好。本文對這種觀點進行了檢驗，認為它忽略了一條重要的邊界條件，即公眾的政策偏好是傾向於遵約的。這一條件未必能夠成立，需要結合具體問題，考察遵約對國內不同群體造成的分配性後果，以判斷公眾的政策偏好。
為了克服所謂的遵約內生性問題、表明承諾本身對國家行為的制約效應，本文以主權債務為例對國家遵約的原因進行了考察。在主權債務問題上，遵約就表現為償債。通過經驗研究，本文發現，違約國會被國際資本市場驅逐，在重返資本市場時不得不支付更高的利率，聲譽存疑的國家通過自我設限、以使潛在的債權人相信償債承諾的可信性，債權人之間形成了集體行動安排、以使聲譽機制能夠發揮作用。這些經驗現象符合聲譽理論的預測，表明聲譽機制有利於促進遵約。
在償債問題上，公眾不一定會支持遵約。開發中國家的國內儲蓄低、債務結構主要是外債。在經濟危機較為嚴重、債務問題成為選民關注的焦點時，償債意味著增稅和削減福利開支，這對廣泛的國內選民造成了不利的分配性後果。當選民運用選舉槓桿對決策者施加影響時，他們更有可能懲罰主張償債的政治家。因此，發展中的民主國家更有可能對主權債務違約。阿根廷選民在1999年和2001年兩次選舉中的投票傾向，以及秘魯和智利在80年代債務危機中對財政穩定方案的履行情況，這兩組比較案例支持了本文的觀點。這一發現表明了在考察國內制度與遵約表現之間的因果關係時，應結合具體問題上遵約/違約對國內公眾的分配性後果，離開邊界條件的民主遵約論不能成立。
[關鍵字]國際制度 遵約 承諾 聲譽 政體類型
本文將國家對國際規則的承諾與遵約納入一個兩階段框架之中。承諾是對事後行為的聲明，而遵約是對事前承諾的落實。遵約也就是國家對自我承諾的遵守。本文認為，聲譽機制是有利於國家遵約的重要因素。違約會對聲譽造成負面影響，使本國在他國心目中成為不可信的契約對象，這損害了違約國在未來的可信承諾能力。國家為了在未來收穫更多的合作收益，不得不克服短期的違約動機以維繫良好的聲譽。因此聲譽是促使國家遵約的重要機制。
聲譽機制不僅在國家間層面起作用，也可能通過國內聽眾成本而發揮影響。民主遵約論認為，民主國家的公眾更有可能通過選舉槓桿懲罰做出違約決策的政治家，因此民主國家的國際承諾更可信、遵約記錄更好。本文對這種觀點進行了檢驗，認為它忽略了一條重要的邊界條件，即公眾的政策偏好是傾向於遵約的。這一條件未必能夠成立，需要結合具體問題，考察遵約對國內不同群體造成的分配性後果，以判斷公眾的政策偏好。
為了克服所謂的遵約內生性問題、表明承諾本身對國家行為的制約效應，本文以主權債務為例對國家遵約的原因進行了考察。在主權債務問題上，遵約就表現為償債。通過經驗研究，本文發現，違約國會被國際資本市場驅逐，在重返資本市場時不得不支付更高的利率，聲譽存疑的國家通過自我設限、以使潛在的債權人相信償債承諾的可信性，債權人之間形成了集體行動安排、以使聲譽機制能夠發揮作用。這些經驗現象符合聲譽理論的預測，表明聲譽機制有利於促進遵約。
在償債問題上，公眾不一定會支持遵約。開發中國家的國內儲蓄低、債務結構主要是外債。在經濟危機較為嚴重、債務問題成為選民關注的焦點時，償債意味著增稅和削減福利開支，這對廣泛的國內選民造成了不利的分配性後果。當選民運用選舉槓桿對決策者施加影響時，他們更有可能懲罰主張償債的政治家。因此，發展中的民主國家更有可能對主權債務違約。阿根廷選民在1999年和2001年兩次選舉中的投票傾向，以及秘魯和智利在80年代債務危機中對財政穩定方案的履行情況，這兩組比較案例支持了本文的觀點。這一發現表明了在考察國內制度與遵約表現之間的因果關係時，應結合具體問題上遵約/違約對國內公眾的分配性後果，離開邊界條件的民主遵約論不能成立。
[關鍵字]國際制度 遵約 承諾 聲譽 政體類型
外文摘要
Legalization and institutionalization have been showing potent sways on contemporary international relations, and rule-based global governance system comes into being in a multitude of world affairs. Whether or not states complied with these rules? Why, if they comply? Inasmuch that these questions seem to be significant in theoretical and practical meaning, relevant enquiry may contribute to understanding the effectiveness or performance of international institutions.
This dissertation ...>> 詳細
This dissertation ...>> 詳細
Legalization and institutionalization have been showing potent sways on contemporary international relations, and rule-based global governance system comes into being in a multitude of world affairs. Whether or not states complied with these rules? Why, if they comply? Inasmuch that these questions seem to be significant in theoretical and practical meaning, relevant enquiry may contribute to understanding the effectiveness or performance of international institutions.
This dissertation integrates state''s commitment to and compliance with international rules into a two-stage framework: commitment exists as a statement on ex post behavior, while compliance emerges as fulfillment on ex ante commitment. I will argue that reputation is an important mechanism to incline states toward deference. Violations will invite a bad reputation qua an unfaithful contract-partner and hurt violator''s future ability to credible commitment. Consequently, states have to make trade-off between short-term gains from defect and long-term gains from good compliance-record, for the sake of maintaining an acceptable reputation. In this way, reputation mechanism enhances states'' compliance willingness.
While operates on inter-state level, however, reputation mechanism may also works on intra-state panel via so-called "domestic audience cost." Some researchers espouse "theory of democratic compliance," which maintains democracies have better capabilities in making credible commitments and keeping good compliance records, by the reason that decision-makers in these countries, vis-a-vis their counterparts in authoritarian states, face higher "domestic audience cost." Such hypothesis, this dissertation argues, overlooks a pivotal boundary condition, that is, electorate tends to support state''s compliance with international rules. Such an assumption, however, not necessarily holds. Accordingly, it is imperative that researchers investigate voters'' policy preferences in a given substantive issue, in the light of domestic distributive consequences of compliance decision.
In order to control so-called "endogeneity problem" and identify constraining effect on state behavior of commitment per se, this dissertation selects sovereign debt as cases. Compliance means repayment service as contracted. In real-world sovereign debt practices, I find four frequent behavioral patterns: 1) sovereign defaulters are excluded from international capital market; 2) when re-accessing to market, defaulters have to make offers with higher interest rate; 3) states with uncertain or tainted reputation resort to self-binding contractual terms so as to persuade potential lenders; 4) creditors establish collective action arrangements to activate reputation mechanism. All of these empirical findings appear consistent with theoretical predictions of reputation hypothesis, and suggest reputation mechanism significantly contributes to state''s faithful repayment or compliance.
More often than not, electorate doesn''t support faithful debt repayment. Due to their low saving rates in developing countries, external debt accounts for the lion share of government debts. When macro-economic fundamental goes from bad to worse and hence when debt-service issue becomes salient, repayment entails, inter alia, increasing tax and/or cutting social welfare expenditure, which strikes a blow against the broad social strata. Empowered with ballots to decide politician''s political survival, the median voter will punish the decision-maker who advocates debt-service. For this reason, developing democracies tend to more default on their sovereign debts than authoritarian states. Two comparative cases support this finding. The first involves the systemic changes of Argentine voters'' behavior from 1999 to 2001. The second compares the notably distinctive compliance-records on financial stability packages between nascent democratic Peru and military dictatorship in Chile. This finding suggests that, while investigating causal impact of regime type on compliance-record, researchers should take into account domestic distributive consequences of international rules. "Theory of democratic compliance," as a universal judgment, should not be applied without certain boundary conditions.
[Key Words] international institutions, compliance, commitment, reputation, regime type
This dissertation integrates state''s commitment to and compliance with international rules into a two-stage framework: commitment exists as a statement on ex post behavior, while compliance emerges as fulfillment on ex ante commitment. I will argue that reputation is an important mechanism to incline states toward deference. Violations will invite a bad reputation qua an unfaithful contract-partner and hurt violator''s future ability to credible commitment. Consequently, states have to make trade-off between short-term gains from defect and long-term gains from good compliance-record, for the sake of maintaining an acceptable reputation. In this way, reputation mechanism enhances states'' compliance willingness.
While operates on inter-state level, however, reputation mechanism may also works on intra-state panel via so-called "domestic audience cost." Some researchers espouse "theory of democratic compliance," which maintains democracies have better capabilities in making credible commitments and keeping good compliance records, by the reason that decision-makers in these countries, vis-a-vis their counterparts in authoritarian states, face higher "domestic audience cost." Such hypothesis, this dissertation argues, overlooks a pivotal boundary condition, that is, electorate tends to support state''s compliance with international rules. Such an assumption, however, not necessarily holds. Accordingly, it is imperative that researchers investigate voters'' policy preferences in a given substantive issue, in the light of domestic distributive consequences of compliance decision.
In order to control so-called "endogeneity problem" and identify constraining effect on state behavior of commitment per se, this dissertation selects sovereign debt as cases. Compliance means repayment service as contracted. In real-world sovereign debt practices, I find four frequent behavioral patterns: 1) sovereign defaulters are excluded from international capital market; 2) when re-accessing to market, defaulters have to make offers with higher interest rate; 3) states with uncertain or tainted reputation resort to self-binding contractual terms so as to persuade potential lenders; 4) creditors establish collective action arrangements to activate reputation mechanism. All of these empirical findings appear consistent with theoretical predictions of reputation hypothesis, and suggest reputation mechanism significantly contributes to state''s faithful repayment or compliance.
More often than not, electorate doesn''t support faithful debt repayment. Due to their low saving rates in developing countries, external debt accounts for the lion share of government debts. When macro-economic fundamental goes from bad to worse and hence when debt-service issue becomes salient, repayment entails, inter alia, increasing tax and/or cutting social welfare expenditure, which strikes a blow against the broad social strata. Empowered with ballots to decide politician''s political survival, the median voter will punish the decision-maker who advocates debt-service. For this reason, developing democracies tend to more default on their sovereign debts than authoritarian states. Two comparative cases support this finding. The first involves the systemic changes of Argentine voters'' behavior from 1999 to 2001. The second compares the notably distinctive compliance-records on financial stability packages between nascent democratic Peru and military dictatorship in Chile. This finding suggests that, while investigating causal impact of regime type on compliance-record, researchers should take into account domestic distributive consequences of international rules. "Theory of democratic compliance," as a universal judgment, should not be applied without certain boundary conditions.
[Key Words] international institutions, compliance, commitment, reputation, regime type
