《公司治理之比較研究》是2016年智慧財產權出版社出版的圖書。
基本介紹
- 中文名：公司治理之比較研究
- 作者：原潔
- 出版社：智慧財產權出版社
- 出版時間：2016年7月
- ISBN：9787513044134
內容簡介,作者簡介,圖書目錄,
內容簡介
公司治理是一個全球性的論題。目前，有一個趨勢就是許多國家選擇採用美國的公司治理模式。中國應該選擇怎樣的公司治理模式？這個實際問題的背後隱含了公司治理領域裡兩個根本性的理論問題，其一是關於是否存在*優公司治理模式的爭論，其二是如何實施公司治理規則，政府應該在何種限度之內干預公司的治理。關於*一個問題，本書對美國的公司治理模式是*優方式這一觀點持不同看法，因為美國公司治理模式下的獨立董事制度存在諸多內在缺陷和未解決的困局，沒有我們預想的完善。另外，同一個公司治理模式在不同國家市場環境下發揮的作用也會不同，很難斷言哪個公司治理模式更好；與此同時，公司治理模式之間亦出現功能性整合的趨勢。關於第二個問題，本書認為有必要在政府干預和市場干預中尋求一個平衡，採用由企業自主選擇的方式可以在某種程度上促使公司治理模式之間的競爭。
Corporate governance is a global topic. There is a trend that many countries choose to follow US’ model. Which model of corporate governance shall China choose? Behind this practical question, involved are two fundamental theoretical issues within corporate governance regime. One is the debate over whether the best practice of corporate governance exists, and the other is how to implement corporate governance rules, and to which extent the government should intervene in the governance of corporations. This paper disagrees with the assertion that “Anglo-American” model is the best practice, arguing that the device of independent director system under “Anglo-American” model has many internal weaknesses and unsolved dilemma, not perfect as we assumed. In addition, the same corporate governance model may have different effect in different countries and markets, and it is difficult to tell which corporate governance system is better. Meanwhile, there is a tendency of functional convergence among the corporate governance models. With respect to the second, this paper holds the view that it is necessary to find a balance between governmental influence and market influence, and to certain extent, optional approach can provide competition among corporate governance models.
作者簡介
原潔 先後畢業於中國政法大學、北京大學及日本九州大學，法學博士。現任教於中國政法大學比較法學研究院。曾赴瑞士比較法中心SICL（Swiss Institute of Comparative Law）進行比較法研究，參加亞洲公司治理研究國際學會（Corporate Governance in East Asia Conference）並做會議發言，在美國Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal，日本《國際商事法務》等雜誌發表多篇論文。
圖書目錄
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Origin and Development of
Independent Director System in US
Introduction
1.Background of initiating independent director system in US
1.1 From shareholder dominance to board of director dominance
1.2 From board of director dominance to managerial dominance
2.Expected function of independent director system in US
3.Adoption of independent director system in US
3.1 Regulatory rules influence
3.2 Institutional shareholder activism
3.3 ALI Corporate Governance Project
3.4 Market participants internal incentive
4.Effectiveness of independent director system in US
4.1 Positive views on effectiveness of independent director system
4.2 Negative views on effectiveness of independent director system
4.3 Other mechanisms monitoring
5.Corporate scandals: failure of gatekeepers in corporate
governance
5.1 Case of Enrons collapse
5.2 Case of Adelphia Communications
5.3 Case of Tyco International
5.4 Case of Global Crossing Ltd.
5.5 Case of WorldComs bankruptcy
6.New rules after the ENRON collapse
6.1 SarbanesOxley Act of 2002
6.2 New Stock Exchange Rules: NYSE（the New York Stock Exchange）
and NASD （the National Association of Securities Dealers）
Summary
Chapter 2 Adoption of Independent
Director System in China
Introduction
1.Shareholding structure in Chinese listed corporations
1.1 Transformation from Stateowned enterprises to modern
corporations
1.2 Shareholding structure in Chinese listed corporations
2.Motivation of introducing independent director system in China
2.1 Invalidity of board of supervisors
2.2 Exploitation of small shareholders by large shareholders
2.3 Influence from government
3.Expected role of independent director system in China
4.Regulations of independent director system in China
4.1 Process of introducing independent director system into China
4.2 Substantial rules of independent director system in China
5.Differences in rules regarding independent director system between
China and the US
5.1 Different expected roles
5.2 Different requirements on proportion
5.3 Different definition of independence
5.4 Different requirement on committee structure
5.5 Different requirement on nomination
5.6 Necessity to reconcile independent director and board of
supervisors
Summary
Chapter 3 Actual Effect of Independent
Director System in China
Introduction
1.Appointment of independent directors in China
2.Nomination of independent directors in China
3.Composition of independent directors in China
4.Participation of independent directors in China
5.Working environment of independent directors in China
6.Replacement of independent directors in China
7.Link between independent directors and corporate performance
8.Two cases about independent directors in China
Summary
Chapter 4 Inherent Weaknesses of
Independent Director System
Introduction
1.Rationale in independent director system
2.Competence problem in independent director system
2.1 Delimitation of “independence”
2.2 Capacity and nomination of independent director
2.3 Tenure and proportion of independent director
3.Incentive problem in independent director system
3.1 Compensation of independent director
3.2 Duties and liabilities of independent director
3.3 Concern for reputation
Summary
Chapter 5 Board of Supervision vs.
Independent Director System
Introduction
1.Analysis of Board of Supervision in Germany
1.1 Arrangement of Board of Supervision in Germany
1.2 Analysis of Board of Supervision
1.3 Marked traits of board of supervision in Germany
2.Appraisal of Board of Supervision in Germany
2.1 The merits of board of supervision
2.2 The weakness of board of supervision
3.Comparison between the two internal monitoring systems in
Germany and US
3.1 Structural differences in the two internal monitoring systems
3.2 Endogenetic differences derived from the local forces
3.3 Special concerns on efficiency of internal control
4.Trend of functional convergence
4.1 Evidence of convergence from American side
4.2 Evidence of convergence from German side
Summary
Chapter 6 Coexistence of Two Internal Monitoring
Systems in One Company
Introduction
1.Different opinions on the coexistence of two internal monitors
2.Arguments for supporting coexistence of two internal monitors
3.Coexistence causes conflicts in regulation
3.1 Overlapped powers and duties between board of supervisors and
independent directors under Chinese regulations
3.2 Conflicting legal status of independent director system and board
of supervisors
4.Coexistence causes conflicts in practice
4.1 Overlapped role of independent director system and board of
supervisors in practical view
4.2 Functional similarity between independent director system and
board of supervisors
4.3 Criticism on certain proposals
4.4 Competition for power on oversight
4.5 Weakening of actual effect on oversight
4.6 Freeriding problem
4.7 Increased cost for the company
4.8 Cost and benefit analysis
Summary
Chapter 7 Mandatory approach or
Optional approach
Introduction
1.Different approaches to implementing independent director
system
1.1 Mandatory approach
1.2 Recommendatory approach
1.3 Optional approach—a hybrid solution
2.Government regulation theory and marketoriented theory
2.1 Government regulation theory
2.2 Contractual or marketoriented theory
3.Appraisal of mandatory approach
3.1 The values of mandatory approach
3.2 Problems with mandatory approach
4.Appraisal of recommendatory approach
4.1 Advantages of recommendatory approach
4.2 Disadvantages of recommendatory approach
5.Evidence from Japanese experience
5.1 Amendment of Japanese Commercial Code in 2002
5.2 Actual effect ofthe amendment in 2002
5.3 Indications from Japanese experience
6.Values of optional approach
6.1 Overcome the detriments of mandatory approach
6.2 Overcome the detriments of recommendatory approach
6.3 Provide competition among corporate governance rules
Summary
Chapter 8 Which Approach is Suitable for China
Introduction
1.Chinese market needs governmental intervention
1.1 Lack of mature free market in China
1.2 Special concern on protecting minority shareholders
2.Improper to mandate independent director system in China
2.1 Inherent problems in the independent director system
2.2 Problems with “transplant effect”
2.3 Doubts on best practice debate
2.4 Weakness of mandatory rules
2.5 A onesizefitsall approach is both costly and unnecessary
3.Suitable and feasible for China to make independent director
system optional
3.1 Wasteful to abandon the independent director system in China
3.2 Improper to mandate the coexistence of independent director
system and supervisory board system in one company
3.3 Feasible to make independent director system optional
