道德情操論(插圖·中文導讀英文版)(2015年清華大學出版社出版的圖書)

道德情操論(插圖·中文導讀英文版)(2015年清華大學出版社出版的圖書)

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《道德情操論(插圖·中文導讀英文版)》是2015年清華大學出版社出版的圖書,作者是[英]亞當·斯密。

基本介紹

  • 中文名: 道德情操論(插圖·中文導讀英文版)
  • 作者:[英]亞當·斯密
  • 出版時間:2015年
  • 出版社: 清華大學出版社
  • ISBN: 9787302390527  
  • 定價:59 元
內容簡介,圖書目錄,

內容簡介

《道德情操論》是一部劃時代的巨著,是古典經濟學的哲學基礎。全書共七卷,主要闡釋道德情感的本質和道德評價的性質。書中列舉了支配人類行為的各種動機,包括自愛、同情心、追求自由的欲望、正義感、勞動習慣和交換傾向等,認為一個人的同情心與思維構造是形成其獨特的道德情操、道德判斷及美德的基礎;闡述了人本性中所有的同情的情感是形成其道德取向的基礎,是人類正義感和其他一切道德情感的形成根源,由此說明道德評價的性質,以此為基礎表明各種基本美德的特徵,並向世人強調:道德和正義對於社會乃至市場經濟的運行是非常重要的。
  無論是作為文學、社會學、哲學和經濟學等專業的經典讀本,還是作為語言學習的課外讀物,本書對當代中國讀者,特別是對社會學、文學、哲學和經濟學等相關專業學習的大學生和從事研究工作的學者都將產生積極的影響。為了使讀者能夠了解每個論述主題的主要內容,進而提高閱讀速度和閱讀水平,在每個主題的開始部分增加了中文導讀。

圖書目錄

第一卷 論行為的適宜性/
Part One Of the Propriety of Action
第一篇 論適宜性/
SectionⅠ Of the Sense of Propriety 3
第一章 論同情/
Chapter 1 Of sympathy 4
第二章 論相互同情的快樂/
Chapter 2 Of the pleasure of mutual sympathy 12
第三章 論比較他人的感情與我們的感情是否一致來判斷他
人感情是否適宜的方式/
Chapter 3 Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety
or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their
concord or dissonance with our own 16
第四章 續前章/
Chapter 4 The same subject continued 21
第五章 論親切的和值得尊敬的美德/
Chapter 5 Of the amiable and respectable virtues 28
第二篇 論各種適宜的激情程度/
Section?Ⅱ Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are
consistent with Propriety 33
引言/
Introduction 34
第一章 論源於身體的激情/
Chapter 1 Of the passions which take their origin from the body 36
第二章 論源於某種特殊傾向或想像習慣的激情/
Chapter 2 Of those passions which take their origin from a particular
turn or habit of the Imagination 42
第三章 論不友好的激情/
Chapter 3 Of the unsocial passions 47
第四章 論友好的激情/
Chapter 4 Of the social passions 54
第五章 論自私的激情/
Chapter 5 Of the selfish passions 57
第三篇 論繁榮和災禍對人們判斷行為是否適宜所產生的影響;
以及為什麼在一種情形下比在另一種情況下更容易獲
得人們的認可/
Section?Ⅲ Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the
Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety
of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their
Approbation in the one state than in the other 63
第一章 雖然我們對悲傷的同情一般比對快樂的同情更為強烈,
但是它通常遠沒有主要當事人自然感受到的強烈/
Chapter 1 That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally
a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy,
it commonly falls much more short of the violence of
what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned 64
第二章 論野心的起源和社會階層的區別/
Chapter 2 Of the origin of ambition,
and of the distinction of ranks 73
第三章 論源於欽佩富人和大人物、輕視或忽視窮人和
小人物的道德情操敗壞/
Chapter 3 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is
occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and
the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and
mean condition 86
第二卷 論優點和缺點;報答與懲處的對象/
Part?Two Of Merit and Demerit; or of the Objects of
Reward and Punishment
第一篇 論對優點和缺點的感覺/
Section Ⅰ Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit 95
引言/
Introduction 96
第一章 任何適宜的感激對象的行為顯然應該得到報答;同樣,
任何適宜的憤恨對象的行為顯然應該受到懲罰/
Chapter 1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of
gratitude appears to deserve reward; and that, in the
same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object
of resentment, appears to deserve punishment 98
第二章 論適當的感激對象和適當的憤恨對象/
Chapter 2 Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 103
第三章 不認可施恩者的行為,就幾乎不會同情受益者的感激;
相反,對損人者的動機表示認同,對受難者的憤恨就
不會有一點同情/
Chapter 3 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of
the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy
with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the
contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of
the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of
sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it 107
第四章 對前幾章的概括/
Chapter 4 Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 110
第五章 對優點和缺點感覺的分析/
Chapter 5 The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit 112
第二篇 論正義和仁慈/
Section?Ⅱ Of Justice and Beneficence 119
第一章 兩種美德的比較/
Chapter 1 Comparison of those two virtues 120
第二章 論對正義、懊悔的感覺,兼論對優點的意識/
Chapter 2 Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the
consciousness of merit 126
第三章 論這種天性構成的效用/
Chapter 3 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature 131
第三篇 關於行為的優點或缺點,論命運對人類情感的影響
Section Ⅲ Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of
Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit
of Actions 141
引言/
Introduction 142
第一章 論這種命運產生影響的原因/
Chapter 1 Of the causes of this influence of fortune 145
第二章 論這種命運產生影響的程度/
Chapter 2 Of the extent of this influence of fortune 150
第三章 論這種無規律情感變化的最終原因/
Chapter 3 Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments 160
第三卷 論評判自己的情感和行為的基礎,兼論責任感/
Part?Three Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty
第一章 論自我認同和不認同的原則/
Chapter 1 Of the principle of self-approbation and
of self-disapprobation 167
第二章 論對讚揚和值得讚揚的喜歡;兼論對責備和
該受責備的恐懼/
Chapter 2 Of the love of praise, and of that of praise-worthiness;
and of the dread of blame, and of that of
blame-worthiness 172
第三章 論良心的威信和影響/
Chapter 3 Of the influence and authority of conscience 195
第四章 論自欺欺人的本性,兼論一般準則的起源和用途/
Chapter 4 Of the nature of self-deceit, and of the origin and
use of general rules 223
第五章 論道德的通常規則的影響和威信,以及它們被公正
地看作神的法則/
Chapter 5 Of the influence and authority of the general rules of
morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws
of the deity 230
第六章 在何種情況下,責任感應該成為人們行為的
唯一準則;在何種情況下,它應該同
其他動機一起發生作用/
Chapter 6 In what cases the sense of duty ought to be
the sole principle of our conduct; and in what
cases it ought to concur with other motives 243
第四卷 論效用對認同情感的作用/
Part Four Of the Effect of Utility upon the
Sentiment of Approbation
第一章 論效用的表現賦予所有藝術作品的美,兼論這種
美所具有的廣泛影響/
Chapter 1 Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows
upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive
influence of this species of beauty 257
第二章 論效用的表現賦予人的行為和品格的美,以及關於
這種美的概念可能在何種程度上被看成一種原始的
認同原則/
Chapter 2 Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows
upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the
perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the
original principles of approbation 268
第五卷 習慣和風氣對認同的與不認同的道德情操的影響/
Part Five Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the
Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation
第一章 論習慣和風氣施加於人們對美和醜看法的影響/
Chapter 1 Of the influence of custom and fashion upon
our notions of beauty and deformity 279
第二章 論習慣和風氣對道德情感的影響/
Chapter 2 Of the influence of custom and fashion upon
moral sentiments 289
第六卷 論美德的品格/
Part Six Of the Character of Virtue
引言/
Introduction 307
第一篇 論個人的品格,就它對其幸福的影響而言;或論謹慎/
Section Ⅰ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it
affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence 309
第二篇 論個人的品格,就它對其他人幸福的影響/
Section Ⅱ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it
can affect the Happiness of other People 319
引言/
Introduction 320
第一章 論天性致使個人成為我們關心和注意的對象
所依據的次序/
Chapter 1 Of the order in which individuals are recommended
by nature to our care and attention 322
第二章 論天性使社會團體成為人們行善對象的次序/
Chapter 2 Of the order in which societies are by nature
recommended to our beneficence 335
第三章 論世界性的行善/
Chapter 3 Of universal benevolence 345
第三篇 論自我支配/
Section Ⅲ Of Self-command 349
第六卷的結論/
Conclusion of the Sixth Part 382
第七卷 論道德的哲學體系/
Part Seven Of Systems of Moral Philosophy
第一篇 論應當在道德情感理論中考慮的問題/
Section Ⅰ Of the Questions which ought to be examined
in a Theory of Moral Sentiments 389
第二篇 論已對美德的本質做出的各種說明/
Section Ⅱ Of the different Accounts which have been
given of the Nature of Virtue 393
引言/
Introduction 394
第一章 論認為美德存在於適宜性之中的那些體系/
Chapter 1 Of those systems which make virtue
consist in propriety 396
第二章 論認為美德存在於謹慎之中的那些體系/
Chapter 2 Of those systems which make virtue
consist in prudence 428
第三章 論認為美德存在於善行之中的那些體系/
Chapter 3 Of those systems which make virtue consist in benevolence 436
第四章 論放肆的體系/
Chapter 4 Of licentious systems 445
第三篇 論已經形成的有關認同原則的各種體系/
Section Ⅲ Of the different Systems which have been
formed concerning the Principle of
Approbation 457
引言/
Introduction 458
第一章 論從自愛推斷出認同原則的那些體系/
Chapter 1 Of those systems which deduce the principle of
approbation from self-love 460
第二章 論把理性看成認同原則的根源的那些體系/
Chapter 2 Of those systems which make reason the principle of
approbation 464
第三章 論把情感看成認同原則的根源的那些體系/
Chapter 3 Of those systems which make sentiment the
principle of approbation 469
第四篇 論不同的作者論述道德實踐規則的方式/
Section Ⅳ Of the Manner in which different Authors have
treated of the practical Rules of Morality 479

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