行政檢察監督研究：從歷史變遷到制度架構

我國檢察權屬於程式性的公權力，不像行政權那樣可以配置資源、在法律授權範圍內創設公民權利義務；也不像審判權那樣能裁斷當事人權利義務，在訴訟程式中處於主導地位，並且享有終端處分權。本書對行政權檢察監督的研究立足於本土法制資源，傳承傳統法律文化，在新的基礎上對傳統進行改造，使異質文明得以生長。通過比較中西檢察制度的差異，闡述中國特色的行政權檢察監督的現實價值；通過分析西方監督權的附屬性(依附於議會)、西方檢察權的性質及其與監督權的界分，在總結近五年來國內檢察權對行政權監督的實踐經驗基礎上，通過大量實證分析，研究行政權檢察監督的特點、規律與走勢，檢察權運作的合理邊界，為完善中國特色的社會主義檢察制度積累有益的經驗。

基本介紹

• 書名：行政檢察監督研究:從歷史變遷到制度架構
• 作者：傅國雲
• 出版社：法律出版社
• 頁數：281頁
• 開本：16
• 品牌：中國法律出版社
• 外文名：Prosecutorial Supervision on Administrative Activites:The History and the Legal Framework
• 類型：人文社科
• 出版日期：2014年5月1日
• 語種：簡體中文
• ISBN：9787511859761

基本介紹

內容簡介

我國法學界和實務界對如何完善檢察權對行政權的監督提出了一些建議和構想，但在檢察權對行政權監督的定位上還存在模糊認識，以至於影響檢察監督模式、範圍的合理界定。《行政檢察監督研究--從歷史變遷到制度架構》由傅國雲所著，本書立足我國的憲政和本土文化，批判地吸收傳統法律文化中的精髓，借鑑西方民主憲政、權力制約的合理核心，根據經濟轉型、社會變遷、司法改革的情勢，尋求符合我國實際的行政檢察監督的基本理論及制度架構。

作者簡介

傅國雲 1962年10月生，浙江衢州人，法學博土。現為浙江省人民檢察院檢察委員會專職委員，兼職教授，浙江省傑出中青年法學專家、全國檢察業務專家，浙江省人民政府行政複議諮詢專家。共撰寫論著100餘萬字，在《新華文摘》、《中國社會科學文摘》、《政法論壇》、《法學家》、《法學》等刊物發表論文100餘篇；在《法制日報》、《檢察日報》、《南方周末》等報刊發表隨筆50餘篇；有個人專著《訴訟邏輯》、《行政自由裁量權與法律控制》2部；多次榮獲省部級科研成果獎。

圖書目錄

目錄內容提要1
引言
一、問題提出
二、研究現狀
三、論證方法
第一章中國古代行政監察制度及其啟示
第一節古代行政監察制度的歷史變遷
一、古代行政監察制度的起源
二、古代行政監察制度的發展
三、古代行政監察制度的完善
第二節古代行政監察的啟示
一、古代行政監察的權源
二、古代行政監察的垂直性
三、古代行政監察的內部制衡
四、古代行政監察方式多樣、範圍較廣
第二章中西對行政權監督的歷史比較
第一節中國古代專制政體下的監督權
一、監察權是一種附屬於皇帝的權力
二、傳統中央集權對西方民主憲政思想的排拒
三、晚清改良與傳統監察制度的逐步解體
第二節西方近代以來憲政制度下的監督權
一、強制約、弱監督的分權模式
二、監督權附屬於立法權
第三節西方檢察權對行政權的制約關係
一、現代西方檢察制度的起源
二、西方檢察權對其他國家權力的制約作用
三、西方檢察權對一般行政權的制約
第四節我國台灣地區“五權憲法”中監察權對行政權的制衡
一、孫中山的分權思想
二、監察權作為獨立的國家權力對行政權的制衡
三、中國傳統監察制度的現代轉型——司法性的檢察權從傳統監察權中分離
第五節新中國檢察制度的創建基礎
第三章行政檢察監督的憲法基礎和法理依據
第一節行政檢察監督的憲法基礎
第二節行政檢察監督的法理依據
一、行政檢察監督是分權制衡的現實要求
二、行政檢察監督是人民權利和自由的現實保障
三、行政檢察監督是建設社會主義法治國家使然
四、行政檢察監督是社會主義民主的重要保障
第三節行政檢察監督的現實必要性
一、政府作為公共利益的代表與行政職能的缺位
二、行政權的公共性與權力運作中的偏私（異化）
三、行政檢察監督的現實性
第四章行政檢察監督的定位與模式架構
第一節理論爭議與制度創新
一、有關檢察權性質的爭論
二、對行政檢察監督的界說
三、制度創新
第二節行政檢察監督的基本原則
一、比例原則
二、事後監督原則
三、有限監督原則
四、超然性原則
五、行政處理先行原則
第三節我國現行憲法框架內行政檢察監督模式之重構
一、訴訟監督模式
二、督促模式——督促行政機關履行職責和提起民事訴訟
三、糾正模式
四、監督抗告模式——與權力機關違憲審查相銜接的憲法監督
第五章行政執法行為檢察監督
第一節涉及國家利益、公共利益的行政違法情形
一、地方和部門利益保護損害國家利益、公共利益
二、濫用行政職權，損害國家利益、公共利益
三、行政不作為造成國家利益、公共利益嚴重損害
第二節行政執法行為檢察監督的方式
一、督促行政機關履行職責
二、向行政機關提出糾正意見
三、提出綜合治理意見
第六章行政公訴
第一節行政公訴的性質
一、行政公訴是檢察權對行政權的一種直接監督
二、行政公訴是檢察權對行政權的有限監督
第二節行政公訴的必要性
第三節行政公訴的謙抑性
第四節行政公訴範圍的界定
第五節行政公訴的程式
一、行政公訴的前置程式
二、行政公訴的提出
三、出庭支持公訴
四、行政公訴案件的抗訴
第六節行政公訴中的舉證責任分配
一、原則上應當由檢察機關負舉證責任
二、行政機關對其控制的行政信息、抽象命令負舉證責任
三、行政機關對公害案件專業性、技術性問題負舉證責任
第七章民事督促起訴
第一節民事督促起訴的現實性
一、國家利益、公共利益保護的缺位
二、民事督促起訴是公共利益優位與公力救濟使然
三、民事督促起訴符合我國檢察權的定位
四、民事督促起訴——走出民事公訴的理論困境
第二節民事督促起訴的條件與範圍
一、民事督促起訴的條件
二、民事督促起訴的範圍
第八章 行政抗訴
第一節 行政抗訴的屬性
一、行政抗訴以公權力監督為軸心
二、行政抗訴具有高度的超然性
第二節 行政訴訟的困惑及行政抗訴的意義
一、行政審判面臨的行政干預不容忽視
二、行政審判的重心偏移到公共權力的異化
三、行政抗訴對於制衡行政權的意義
第三節強化行政抗訴對審判權、行政權的制約與監督
一、嚴格行政抗訴審級，克服司法地方保護和行政干預
二、行政抗訴再審不因當事人撤訴而終止
三、以抗訴理由為審理範圍，凸顯檢察監督的強制性
四、賦予檢察機關調查取證權，直接監督行政權的濫用
五、出席再審法庭，加強對審判權、行政權的動態監督
第四節對行政訴訟中行政機關的監督
一、 對行政訴訟中行政機關監督的範圍
二、具體監督方式
第九章抗告程式——提請權力機關審議行政抽象命令
第一節行政抽象命令的法律效力
一、行政抽象命令的性質
二、行政抽象命令的法律效力
第二節行政抽象命令的法理基礎
一、行政的公共利益本位與公共政策之必須
二、行政委任立法的局限，需通過行政抽象命令加以克服
三、國家干預的需要(包括巨觀調控)
第三節行政抽象命令存在的弊端
一、違憲
二、與上位法相衝突
三、地方保護、地方割據
四、違反正當程式
第四節行政抽象命令檢察監督必要性
一、立法機關監督的抽象性
二、司法審查的局限性
三、行政抽象命令檢察監督的現實性
第五節行政抽象命令檢察監督程式
一、調查程式
二、督促修改或廢止違法的行政抽象命令
三、啟動權力機關監督程式
第十章行政檢察調解——法律監督中的替代性糾紛解決方法
第一節行政檢察調解的現實價值
一、行政檢察調解體現訴訟經濟
二、行政檢察調解有利於維護公共秩序，促進社會和諧
三、行政檢察調解有利於及時實現當事人(原告)的正當利益和訴求
四、行政檢察調解有助於當事人(原告)對自己的正當權益實行高度自治
第二節行政檢察調解的正當性
一、行政檢察調解符合檢察權的定位
二、行政檢察調解不會影響勝訴方當事人（原審原告）的利益
三、行政檢察調解與生效裁判的既判力並不矛盾
第三節法律政策與傳統習慣的良性互動
第四節相關間接利益的協調與再審解紛局限性的克服
第五節行政檢察調解的原則
一、合法原則
二、自願和尊重當事人處分權原則
三、衡平原則
四、效率原則
五、正當程式原則
第六節行政檢察調解的範圍和效力
一、行政檢察調解的範圍
二、行政檢察調解的效力
參考文獻
致謝〖=

序言

內容提要
我國法學界和實務界對如何完善檢察權對行政權的監督提出了一些建議和構想，但在檢察權對行政權監督的定位上還存在模糊認識，以至於影響檢察監督模式、範圍的合理界定，要么失之過寬，落入不具有可行性的一般監督窠臼；要么失之過窄，將檢察權監督行政權僅限於對行政管理中職務犯罪領域的監督，這顯然不利於強化法律監督，制約日益擴張的行政權。
目前，隨著我國刑事訴訟法、民事訴訟法的修改，我國刑事、民事檢察制度逐步完善，但行政檢察制度仍然很不健全，除了《中華人民共和國人民警察法》（1995年）、《中華人民共和國治安管理處罰法》（2005年），以及廢止的國務院《勞動教養的補充規定》（1979年）、《勞動教養試行辦法》（1982年）、《勞動教養條例》（1995年）對行政檢察監督作原則性規定，其他法律有關行政檢察的規定基本處於空白。然而行政檢察制度構建應當成為完善中國特色檢察制度的重中之重。實踐中，檢察權監督行政權的手段、方法不多，措施也不夠有力，對於行政人員濫用職權、玩忽職守，只有觸犯刑律，檢察機關才予以介入，即按照刑事訴訟法規定追究有關行政人員的刑事責任，而對行政管理中的濫用職權、不作為違法等導致國家利益、公共利益嚴重損害的，只要尚未構成刑事指控條件的，通常不予直接監督，最多將發現的這類違法線索移交有關部門處理，對與此相關的國資流失及損害公共利益的問題往往不太關注，即便向有關部門發出檢察建議，也缺乏跟蹤監督，一般也難以收到實際效果。尤其是對行政監管權、行政抽象命令的檢察監督的研究基本上處於空白狀態。因此，有必要從我國實際出發，按照檢察權屬性、定位，科學地界定現行檢察權對行政權的監督模式、具體範圍，合理設計監督程式。
我國檢察權屬於程式性的公權力，不像行政權那樣可以配置資源，在法律授權範圍內創設公民權利義務；也不像審判權那樣能裁斷當事人權利義務，在訴訟程式中處於主導地位，並且享有終局處分權。按照權力區分原理，應該強化這部分權力，增加其對行政權監督的剛性與效應，以有效制約行政權，防止和減少行政權的濫用。筆者立足本土法制文化，批判地繼承傳統監察制度中監督權的獨立性、垂直性、強制性，豐富我國檢察監督的內涵，保障檢察監督應有的權威和作用；借鑑古代御史制度中的都御史與監察御史上下級之間權力相互獨立、相互牽制的體制，建立一套科學合理的內部制約機制，以解決對監督者的監督問題。同時，在比較研究的基礎上，結合中國實際，借鑑域外監督制度及我國傳統法制文化的有益經驗，為檢察權對行政權的監督提供堅實的理論支持。在我國現行法律框架下，反思和重構行政檢察監督的模式，界定監督的合理範圍，設定科學的運作程式，使檢察權對行政權的監督保特其必要性、有限性、謙抑性。總之，本書立足我國的憲法定位和本土文化，批判地吸收傳統法律文化中的精髓，借鑑西方民主、權力制約理論的合理核心，根據經濟轉型、社會變遷、司法改革的情勢，尋求符合我國實際的行政檢察監督的基本理論及制度架構。
本書共分十章內容：
第一章，分析我國古代御史制度的變遷，借鑑傳統監察權的合理核心。透過古代監察制度產生、發展到解體的整個演變過程，探尋我國古代監察權的權源、性質、地位和作用，以及監察權內部的分權制約等。運用歷史分析方法，辯證地看待傳統監察制度中對行政權監督的價值。筆者認為，傳統中國監察權是皇權的延伸，它必須無條件地為皇帝及以皇帝為代表的官僚集團服務；同時，中國古代監察機構自成體系，實行垂直統轄，行政長官不得染指監察官的選任，保證監察官有效行使職權。其中，監察權的獨立性、垂直性、權威性值得我們借鑑。該章研究我國傳統監察制度的轉型，揭示我國古代監督性質的監察權與近代司法行政性質的檢察權的根本差異，為中國行政檢察監督制度的構建提供合理的借鑑。
第二章，比較中國傳統監察制度與西方近代以來的監督制度的差異，吸收人類監督制度的文明成果。通過比較法的方法對我國傳統監察權與西方民主憲政下的監督權作比較，揭示出傳統監察權系皇權對包括行政權在內的其他國家權力的集權性監督，與西方近代以來的君權有限、分權制衡下的監督權有著根本的區別。有著悠久自然法傳統的西方國家監督權系隸屬於國會立法權之下的權力，更多地體現為立法權對行政權的制衡，是權力分立之下的制衡。這與我國傳統監察權對其他權力，特別是對行政權居高臨下的監督有質的不同。不管是英美行政性的檢察權，還是歐陸司法性的檢察權，儘管對其他權力有一定的監督作用，但主要體現的是制約，即弱監督、強制約。西方國家自近代以來也認識到三權分立的不足及監督權獨立的重要性，紛紛仿效瑞典的議會監察專員制度，加強對行政權的監督，從而保障國家監督權的專門性、獨立性，這已經成為一個趨勢。
在長期的封建社會中司法權和行政權的交錯、公訴權和審判權的合一，使得以公訴權為核心的西方檢察權在中國的移植缺乏本土資源，但卻形成了以彈劾查處官吏和監督制約審判為主要內容的、部分職能與檢察權重合的御史制度。清末以後，引進了西方的審、檢分離，進行訴訟民主化改革，在中國逐步建立起以公訴權為內容的檢察制度。嚴格地說，中國古代並沒有檢察制度。孫中山先生在借鑑西方三權分立和我國古代御史制度的基礎上提出了“五權分立”，為獨立的國家監督權構建奠定了堅實的基礎。新中國檢察制度是在廢除國民黨“六法全書”的基礎上建立的，它以列寧法律監督理論為基礎，結合我國的國情建構專門法律監督制度。其中帶有高度中央集權和大一統的計畫經濟的印記，如一般監督即如此。這與當代中國構建公民社會，崇尚契約自由的精神相比，顯得日益滯後。筆者認為，檢察機關專門法律監督權作為一種獨立的公共權力，應當堅持有限監督的原則，超然於各種利益紛爭，盡力做到客觀公正，監督權的運作始終圍繞公共權力這個軸心，以權力制衡為目標，特別是確保行政權力在法治的軌道上運行。在現實中要避免監督權力過度擴張，以致陷入“大監督”的泥潭，造成對其他國家權力的不當干預，浪費有限的監督資源，違背設立專門國家監督權的初衷。
第三章，透析我國檢察權對行政權監督的法律與憲法基礎，揭示行政權力檢察監督的現實必要性。通過對我國法律制度的分析，筆者指出，我國人民代表大會擁有完整的國家權力，實行一元多立的權力構架，即一元權力——人民代表大會下，分出立法權、行政權、審判權、檢察權、軍事權，其中立法權由人民代表大會自己保留，而將行政權、審判權、檢察權、軍事權分別授予行政機關、審判機關、檢察機關、軍事機關行使，這些機構都由人民代表大會產生，對人民代表大會負責。在這種權力構架下，人民代表大會及其常務委員會固然有權對由其產生及下轄的諸權能實施監督，但是，這種監督只能是巨觀的監督和對國家、社會重大事項的監督，而不可能是經常性、專門性的具體的監督。故須在人民代表大會下設立專門的法律監督權，使得國家權力機關的巨觀監督具體化。從而有必要將專門法律監督權賦予檢察機關行使，包括對行政權的專門法律監督。因為審判權對行政權的制約體現為通過行政訴訟進行司法審查，撤銷或變更違法的具體行政行為，控制行政權的濫用。但由於審判權是一種消極、被動的權力，遵循的是“不告不理”的訴訟原則，因而其對行政權的制約只是在相對狹小的範圍內進行。檢察權具有對其他並行的公共權力的“糾舉”、“彈劾”性質, 有利於彌補法院司法審查之不足。
第四章，通過對行政檢察監督的實證分析，提出行政檢察監督的原則和基本框架。筆者對近幾年來理論界有關行政檢察監督的主要觀點進行辯證分析，結合多年來的檢察監督的創新實踐，探索符合中國實際的檢察監督模式，並提出了有限監督、事後監督、合乎比例、行政處理先行、超然性原則。特別是比例原則對於科學合理界定行政檢察監督的範圍和方式具有積極意義，即行政檢察監督在監督手段上，如果有多種監督方式可以行使的話，則應選擇有利於發揮行政管理能動性的監督方式；程式上，只有在無法通過行政救濟（包括行政複議、行政訴訟及行政體制內部監督）途徑解決，而且涉及國家利益、公共利益，行政檢察監督才予以介入；實體上，涉及私法領域，檢察機關應當尊重當事人意思自治、契約自由的原則，儘可能地減少公權力對市場的干預，以確保交易秩序的穩定。如在行政訴訟中，對被告行政機關與原告行政相對人之間達成的和解，只要不損害國家利益、公共利益的，檢察機關應當予以尊重。從而使檢察權真正做到有所為，有所不為，著力制行政權之“惡”，揚行政權之“善”，在我國現行法律制度下，構建檢察權對行政權監督的基本框架。
第五章，行政執法行為檢察監督是指檢察機關針對涉及國家利益、公共利益的行政違法行為的法律監督，即檢察機關發現行政機關或法律法規授權組織違法行使權力、濫用職權、不作為違法等損害國家利益、公共利益，向有關行政機關或法律法規授權組織發出檢察建議、糾正意見，督促其在合理期限內履行法定職權，並將處理結果書面答覆檢察機關。同時，針對存在行政管理漏洞，提出綜合治理意見和建議，促使行政機關、法律法規授權組織建立完善有關制度、機制，以促進依法行政和創新社會管理。
第六章，探索行政公訴制度，加強對行政管理權的直接監督。筆者從我國憲法與檢察權的定位入手，從比較法的視角分析我國行政公訴不同於西方國家行政公訴的特點,認為我國行政公訴既是一種公力救濟,又具有典型的監督屬性。它始終以公權力監督為主線，體現了對行政權的直接監督、有限監督。據此，從公共利益優先權和公力救濟有限性的角度，提出了行政公訴的範圍界定，將督促行政主體履行職責作為提起行政公訴的前置程式，以節省訴訟成本，提高監督效率。基於檢察機關擁有特別的公權力，檢察監督具有明顯的司法性、專門性、專業性，以及為了防止行政公訴的恣意,訴訟中應當以檢察機關負舉證責任為原則，行政機關僅對其控制的行政信息情報、規範性檔案以及公害案件涉及的高度專業性、技術性問題負責舉證。
第七章，從檢察權對行政權法律監督與檢察權對國家利益、公共利益救濟的統一性出發，建立對行政監管權法律監督的新機制——民事督促起訴。民事督促起訴是指針對正在流失或即將流失的國有資產，監管部門不行使或懈怠於行使自己的監管職責，檢察機關以監督者的身份，督促有關監管部門履行自己的職責，依法提起民事訴訟，保護國家利益和社會公共利益。這是近年來民事行政檢察實踐中正在探索的一種新的監督方式,理論上的研究尚屬罕見。據此，從國家利益、公共利益優先權和公力救濟有限性的角度，對民事督促起訴的範圍、條件程式等問題作初步探討。
第八章，完善行政抗訴監督制度，加強對具體行政行為的檢察監督。通過闡述行政抗訴對審判權的直接監督與對行政權間接監督的雙重性，以及行政抗訴對監督制衡行政權的現實意義，分析目前行政訴訟中的突出問題，提出了有助於克服部門保護、地方保護的強化行政抗訴監督的構想。
第九章，研究行政抽象命令的屬性及現實弊端，構建行政抽象命令檢察監督的程式。從嚴格意義上說，行政抽象命令（主要指行政機關對外發布的規章以外的規範性檔案）不屬於法律的淵源，但對行政管理、行政複議以及行政審判的意義不容忽視，大量的經濟社會事務管理活動是依靠行政抽象命令來實施的，其存在具有堅實的法理基礎。然而隨著市場經濟的發展和政府公共服務的加強，行政權也會呈現出擴張的態勢，行政抽象命令不可避免地滲透到社會的各個領域，包括其對公民、法人及其他組織正當權益的侵奪，以及損害社會主義法制的統一，導致公權力的失控和濫用，從而加強對行政抽象命令的外部監督就成為一個現實的議題。基於我國權力機關對行政抽象命令監督的非專門性和非職業性，法院對行政抽象命令的司法審查作用又十分有限，因此，檢察機關作為專門法律監督機關根據憲法、法律的定位，應當履行對行政抽象命令的法律監督職責，以克服行政體系內部監督的局限性，實現對行政權力的制衡。同時，對行政抽象命令的檢察監督程式提出了初步的構想。
第十章，由於檢察環節的行政申訴案件往往經過一審、二審甚至再審，當事人歷經漫長的訴訟之旅，此類案件的社會敏感性、關聯性、對抗性增強，潛在的社會風險增大，稍有不慎，極易引發新的矛盾和衝突。為順應多元化的利益訴求，檢察機關必須採取多元化的糾紛解決方法，延伸訴訟監督職能，著力化解行政爭議，從而行政檢察調解就成為十分重要的替代性糾紛解決方法。筆者通過行政檢察調解的現實價值、正當性分析論證，提出行政檢察調解的原則、範圍和效力，使此項糾紛解決方式能切實地平衡協調各種利益，克服和彌補行政審判制度的不足，實現法律的秩序價值和“接近正義”。


Abstract

Scholars from academic and professional backgrounds have made some recommendations on how to improve the effect of using procuratorial power to supervise administrative power. However, the ambiguity in terms of conceptualizing this supervision affects the definition of the paradigm and the scope of administrative procuratorial supervision, either too broad as general procuratorial supervision to operate in practice or too narrow as limited to dutyrelated crimes to be effective in restricting the administrative power in expansion.
With the modification of Chinas Criminal Procedure Law and Civil Procedure Law, the procuratorial supervision systems have been gradually improved in both criminal and civil laws, with the exception in administrative law. Currently the administrative procuratorial supervision is only provided in principle in the Public Security Administration and Punishments Law promulgated by the Standing Committee of National Peoples Congress (the Standing Committee of NPC) in 2005, the State Councils Supplementary Decision on Reeducation Through Labor in 1979, the Trial Measures on Reeducation Through Labor in 1982, and the Rules on Reeducation Through Labor in 1995. The construction of administrative procuratorial supervision system should be one of the most important supervision systems with Chinese characteristics. Nevertheless, there is few pragmatic means available for procuratorial authority to supervise the use of administrative power. And the measures that can be taken for administrative procuratorial supervision are very weak. Even when abuse of administrative power or neglect of duty occurs, procuratorial authority cannot intervene unless such behavior violates criminal law as well. In that case, only criminal responsibilities will be pursued according to criminal procedures, leaving unsupervised those administrative behaviors that cause severe damages to public interests and state interests because of abuse of power or omission of duty, but fail to constitute criminal offences. At best, those identified evidences of violation of law will be transferred to competent authorities for further investigation, although the resulting loss of stateowned assets and damages to public interests are usually ignored. But absent followup supervision, the efficacy of such investigation is often questionable. In particular, scholarship on administrative regulation and the procuratorial supervision on pure administrative order is almost nonexistent. Therefore, it is necessary to set out from the reality in China and the conceptualization ofprocuratorial power, define the paradigm and the scope of procuratorial supervision on administrative power and design a set of proper procedures for such supervision.
Procuratorial power is a form of public rights in procedural law. It is different than administrative power that can allocate resources and create rights and obligations of citizens, and distinguished from judiciary power that can judge the rights and obligations of relevant parties, dominate in legal proceedings, and make the final decision. According to the principles of power separation, procuratorial power should be strengthened enough to effectively restrict the use of administrative power and prevent from abuses. To solve these problems, this book sets root in the Chinese legal culture, critically analyses the characteristics of traditional supervision systems, and studies the interrestricting mechanism between independent, different levels of supervision authorities in ancient supervision systems, with a view to enrich the concept of procuratorial supervision in China, ensure the procuratorial supervision to be authoritative and functional, and build up a set of reasonable internalpowerrestricting mechanisms. In the meantime, this book provides a solid theoretical ground for procuratorial supervision on administrative power by examining the Chinese traditional legal culture and foreign procuratorial supervision systems from a comparative perspective, and combing with Chinese realities. Within the current Chinese legal framework, this book rethinks and reconstructs the paradigm of procuratorial supervision on administrative power, defines the reasonable scope of such supervision, and designs appropriate procedures in a way that preserves the necessity, limitedness, and modesty of procuratorial supervision. In summary, while acknowledging the supreme status of Chinese Constitutional Law and taking into account the reality of economic and social transition and legal reform in China, this book attempts to construct the theoretical and institutional framework of administrative procuratorial supervision by critically assimilating the essence of traditional legal culture and drawing on the rationality of western democracy and power restriction.
This book is divided into ten chapters.
Chapter One analyses the Yushi supervision system in imperial China and extracts the merits of the traditional systems. It reviews the evolving process of the traditional supervision systems from the origin to the development to the demise, and investigates the source of power, the nature, the status, and the role of traditional supervision power as well as the separation and restriction mechanism within the supervision systems. Using historical research methods, this chapter dialectically examines the value of supervision on administrative power in traditional supervision systems, and argues that in imperial China, supervision power was the extension of royal authority, meaning that it served the interests of the King and the ruling bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the traditional supervision authority adopted an independent, vertical administration system, with the chief supervisor having no power to intervene in the appointment of individual supervisors, thus ensuring the supervision power to be effectively performed. The independence, vertical administration, and authoritativeness of the traditional supervision systems are merits that deserve the use for reference in our current system. This chapter also studies the transformation of traditional supervision systems, revealing the root difference between traditional supervision power as monitoring check and modern procuratorial power as judiciary check.
Chapter Two compares the Chinese traditional supervision systems with the power check system in modern West, with a view to draw on the successful experience in foreign countries. Based on the comparison, this chapter discovers the difference between the two: tradition supervision power in imperial China as a form of royal authority is a collective supervision on all other state powers including administrative power, whereas the power check system embedded in western constitutional democracy rests on the limitation of royal power and the separation and restriction of various powers. Western countries have the natural law tradition since long, and the power check system as part of the Congresss legislative power, such as the Parliament Commissioner system, represents the restriction of legislative power on administrative power, because they are separated. This differs from the Chinese traditional supervision power that overlooks the use of administrative power. Either the procuratorial power in Britain and the US, or that in European continents, reflects the restriction of power, though with certain supervision effects, suggesting a pattern of weak supervision and strong restriction. Nevertheless, western countries had realized the shortcomings of power separation and the significance of the independence of supervision power. Consequently, they began simulating Swede in setting up Parliament Commissioner to strengthen the supervision on administrative power and thus ensure the specificity and independence of state supervision power, which has become a trend.
In imperial China, judiciary power and administrative power had been mixed together, and prosecution and trial mixed together, for such a long time that the implantation of western procuratorial system centered on prosecution failed in China. But there formed the Yushi supervision system, mainly comprised of systems concerning investigation and impeachment of officers and systems concerning supervision restricting trial, where the supervision power partly correlated with procuratorial power. After the demise of the Qing Dynasty, China introduced the system separating judiciary power from procuratorial power and started the democratization of litigation, thus gradually establishing the procuratorial system in China. Strictly speaking, there was no procuratorial system in imperial China. The procuratorial system in the new founded Peoples Republic of China, completely abolishing the National Partys “Six Laws”, was established on the foundation of Leninist legal supervision theory in combination with the Chinese realities, and thus influenced by power centralism and planning economy. For that, general supervision in China is an example. This pattern seems more and more obsolete relative to the spirit of civil society and contract freedom in modern China. This chapter argues that the special legal supervision power of the procuratorial authority is an independent public right, independent of various interests, and should follow the principle of limited supervision to purse justice. The operation of this procuratorial power should revolve around the axis of public right with the aim of restriction of power, and ensure the administrative power running in the legal orbit. In practice, it is important to prevent the overexpansion of the procuratorial power from inappropriately intervening in other state powers and leading to the waste of the scarce resources in supervision that contradicts the original purpose of setting up state supervision authority.
Chapter Three analyses the constitutional basis and the legal rules of using procuratorial power to supervise administrative power in China, suggesting the necessity of administrative procuratorial supervision. Through a doctrinal analysis of the Chinese laws, this chapter argues that the NPC enjoys the complete state power that is divided into legislative power, administrative power, judiciary power, procuratorial power, and military power. The NPS reserves the legislative power while conferring the other powers respectively to administrative authority, judiciary authority, procuratorial authority and military authority, which are assigned by the NPC and report to the NPC. Within this power framework, the NPC and its Standing Committee obviously can supervise all the other powers, but this supervision could only be macro and focus on matters with significant national and social influence, instead of regular and specific supervision. Hence, there is need to set up a special agency responsible for legal supervision, in order to specify the macro supervision of the NPC. That is the procuratorial authority, empowered to supervise the use of other state powers including administrative power. Judiciary power may also be a restriction on administrative power through administrative litigations and reversing or altering specific administrative actions that violates the law. Because of the “no sue, no trial” principle, however, judiciary power is passive in nature and thus the restriction on administrative power is narrow in scope. In contrast, procuratorial authority can impeach other parallel state powers and thus can remedy the inadequacy of judiciary review of the use of administrative power.
Chapter Four proposes the principles and the paradigm of procuratorial supervision on administrative power, based on the empirical analysis of such supervision. This chapter reviews the existing scholarship on administrative procuratorial supervision and explores the realistic paradigm of procuratorial supervision. According to many years of experience in this respect, it proposes four principles of procuratorial supervision: limited supervision, ex post supervision, proportionality, and prelitigation administrative review. The principle of proportionality, in particular, has profound implications for defining the scope and the means of administrative procuratorial supervision. If there are multiple means of supervision available, the procuratorial authority should opt for the one that may maximize the activeness of administrative power. In terms of procedure, only when there is no administrative meansincluding administrative review, administrative litigation, and the internal supervision system within the administrative authorityto redress the problem that has state interests and public interests at stake could the procuratorial supervision intervene. When referring to private law matters, the procuratorial authority should respect the individual autonomy and the freedom of contract, and minimize the intervention in market to ensure the stability of market order. For example, the procuratorial authority should respect the settlement made during administrative litigations between the defendant administrative authority and the plaintiff. To make sure procuratorial power do what it should do and undo what it shouldn’t means that administrative procuratorial supervision should function as supporting good administrative actions while restricting bad ones, a paradigm of procuratorial supervision on administrative power constructed within the current legal framework in China.
Chapter Five defines procuratorial supervision on administrative actions as the legal supervision of procuratorial authority over administrative actions that violate the law and have state interests and public interests at stake. When the procuratorial authority finds unlawful use of administrative power, abuse of power, or omission of duty that caused or may cause damage to state interests and public interests, it can issue supervising opinions orcorrecting suggestions to the administrative authority that conducted the above behavior, and urge it to perform its duty within specified period and report to the procuratorial authority in written form. As to the errors in administrative management, the procuratorial authority can also make recommendations on how to correct, thus inducing the administrative authority to improve relevant regulations and mechanisms dedicated to ensure administration according to law.
Chapter Six explores the system of administrative prosecution as a form of direct supervision over administrative power. Starting from the constitutional status of procuratorial power, it analyses the characteristics of Chinese administrative prosecution through a comparison with that in western countries. It argues that administrative prosecution in China represents not only a means of remedy through public rights but also has the effect of supervision, the public right supervision that is also direct but limited supervision on administrative power. Based on the priority of public interests and the limitation of remedy though public rights, this chapter defines the scope of administrative prosecution and proposes urging administrative authorities to perform their duties as the preceding procedure, for the consideration of reducing litigation costs and increasing efficiency. Given the judicial, special and professional characteristics of procuratorial supervision, the burden of proof in administrative prosecution should be principally assumed by the procuratorial authority, while the administrative authority is only responsible for proof as to the administrative information and normative documents it controls, as well as technical issues in public damage cases.
Chapter Seven presents the civil urging prosecution system, a new mechanism of administrative procuratorial supervision that derives from the consistency of procuratorial supervision on administrative power with the remedy for state interests and public interests. Civil urging prosecution refers to the case where the failure of administrative authority to perform the duty of administrative regulation causes or may cause the loss of stateowned assets and the procuratorial authority as the supervisor can urge the relevant authority to preform its duty, or bring about civil litigation against it to protect the state interests and public interests. This is a new approach to procuratorial supervision still tested in the practice of civil and administrative procuratorial supervision and rarely researched in scholarship. This chapter provides a preliminary discussion of the scope and the requirements for civil urging prosecution, and the procedural relationship with civil prosecution.
Chapter Eight focused on the administrative protest system as a means of procuratorial supervision on specific administrative actions. It discusses the dual role of administrative protest in directly supervising judiciary power and indirectly supervising administrative power, and the implication for the restriction of administrative power. An analysis of the central issues in administrative litigations is also provided, before proposing some suggestions on how to improve the administrative protest system in preventing bureaucratic protectionism and local protectionism.
Chapter Nine studies the characteristics and deficiencies of pure administrative order, and attempts to construct the system of procuratorial supervision on pure administrative orders. In the strict sense, pure administrative orderreferring to the normative documents other than regulations issued by administrative authoritiesis not a source of law. But the impact of pure administrative order on administrative management, administrative review, and administrative trial is worthy to note, because the administration of a large part of economic and social matters relies on pure administrative orders. The existence of them stands on solid jurisprudence ground. However, with the development of market economy and the strengthening of government service, administrative power is tended to expand. Pure administrative orders penetrate every corner of the society, even infringing on the legitimate interests of citizens and entities, undermining the uniformity of the socialist legal system, and leading to state power out of control and power abuses. Hence, strengthening the external supervision on pure administrative orders becomes a pragmatic issue. Since the NPC does not set special or professional supervision on pure administrative orders, and given the limitation of judiciary review on pure administrative orders, the procuratorial authority, according to the Constitution and laws, should assume the responsibility of supervising pure administrative orders to overcome the limitation of the internal supervision within the administrative system and effectuate the restriction on administrative power. This chapter also proposes some preliminary recommendations as to the procedures of procuratorial supervision on pure administrative orders.
Chapter Ten investigates the problems in administrative appeal system, pointing out that administrative appeal may be lasting because of many instances of trials and with the increase in social sensitiveness, correlation with each other, and the contradiction of interests within these cases, administrative appeal bears high risk of inducing new conflicts. To satisfy the diversified interests, the procuratorial authority must adopt diversified methods of dispute resolution, extend the supervision on litigations, and vigorously settle administrative disputes. Hence, administrative procuratorial settlement becomes an important alternative dispute resolution. This chapter analyses the justification and the implication of administrative procuratorial settlement, and proposes the principles, the scope, and the effect of administrative procuratorial settlement. It is expected that this dispute resolution would balance the interests of various stakeholders, overcome the inadequacy of administrative trial system, and realize the value of law and the access to justice.