《美國證券法判例和解析》主要講述了，為了完成其光榮使命，中國政法大學比較法學研究院開展了豐富的教學科研活動。這些活動中形成的各種學術成果均蘊藏著比較法教學與科研的最新成果與思想財富，頗具學術價值，非常值得整理出版。這些成果若以單本出版發行，難見系統，編為文庫出版，方能相得益彰，蔚為壯觀，既便於研讀查考，又利於文化積累。
基本介紹
- 書名：美國證券法判例和解析
- 作者：朱偉一 高祥
- 出版社：中國政法大學出版社
- 頁數：607頁
- 開本：16
- 定價：86.00
- 外文名：Securities Regulation Cases and Explanations
- 類型：證券法
- 出版日期：2013年11月1日
- 語種：簡體中文
- ISBN：9787562050995
- 品牌：中國政法大學出版社
內容簡介,圖書目錄,文摘,
內容簡介
《美國證券法判例和解析》由中國政法大學出版社出版。
圖書目錄
總序
判例集說明（代序）
—、發行
證交會—訴—愛德華茲
證交會—訴—墨菲
瑞士信貸—訴—比林
平特—訴—達爾
比利—訴—阿瑟楊
二、交易
證交會—訴—德克薩斯海灣硫磺公司
美國—訴—莫海倫
歐內斯特—訴—霍克費爾德
羅斯—訴—博爾頓
三、併購
證交會—訴—卡特·哈維萊·哈勒公司
證交會—訴—美國銀行
四、理財
戈爾登—訴—證交會
瓊斯—訴—哈里斯有限責任合夥企業
洛—訴—證交會
內斯比特—訴—麥克尼爾
克雷米銀行—訴—亞歷克斯、布朗和兒子
加比利—訴—證交會
五、索賠
斯通里奇—訴—科技亞特蘭大公司
希爾森/美國運通—訴—麥克馬洪
附錄
證交會—訴—高盛
判例集說明（代序）
—、發行
證交會—訴—愛德華茲
證交會—訴—墨菲
瑞士信貸—訴—比林
平特—訴—達爾
比利—訴—阿瑟楊
二、交易
證交會—訴—德克薩斯海灣硫磺公司
美國—訴—莫海倫
歐內斯特—訴—霍克費爾德
羅斯—訴—博爾頓
三、併購
證交會—訴—卡特·哈維萊·哈勒公司
證交會—訴—美國銀行
四、理財
戈爾登—訴—證交會
瓊斯—訴—哈里斯有限責任合夥企業
洛—訴—證交會
內斯比特—訴—麥克尼爾
克雷米銀行—訴—亞歷克斯、布朗和兒子
加比利—訴—證交會
五、索賠
斯通里奇—訴—科技亞特蘭大公司
希爾森/美國運通—訴—麥克馬洪
附錄
證交會—訴—高盛
文摘
著作權頁：
We begin with the language of 36 (b) . As noted, the Seventh Circuit panelthought that the phrase "fiduciary duty" incorporates a standard taken from the lawof trusts. Petitioners agree but maintain that the panel identified the wrong trust-lawstandard. Instead of the standard that applies when a trustee and a settlor negotiatethe trustee's fee at the time of the creation of a trust, petitioners invoke the standardthat applies when a trustee seeks compensation after the trust is created. Brief for Pe-titioners 20-23, 35-37. A compensation agreement reached at that time, theypoint out, " ' will not bind the beneficiary' if either the trustee failed to make afull disclosure of all circumstances affecting the agreement' " which he knew orshould have known or if the agreement is unfair to the beneficiary. Id., at 23 ( quo-ting Restatement (Second) of Trusts 242, Comment i) . Respondent, on the oth-er hand, contends that the term "fiduciary" is not exclusive to the law of trusts, thatthe phrase means different things in different contexts, and that there is no reason tobelieve that 36 (b) incorporates the specific meaning of the term in the law oftrusts. Brief for Respondent 34-36.
We find it unnecessary to take sides in this dispute. In Pepperv. Litton, 305U. S. 295 (1939), we discussed the meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty in acontext that is analogous to that presented here, and we also looked to trust law. Atissue in Pepperwas whether a bankruptcy court could disallow a dominant or control"ling shareholder's claim for compensation against a bankrupt corporation.
We begin with the language of 36 (b) . As noted, the Seventh Circuit panelthought that the phrase "fiduciary duty" incorporates a standard taken from the lawof trusts. Petitioners agree but maintain that the panel identified the wrong trust-lawstandard. Instead of the standard that applies when a trustee and a settlor negotiatethe trustee's fee at the time of the creation of a trust, petitioners invoke the standardthat applies when a trustee seeks compensation after the trust is created. Brief for Pe-titioners 20-23, 35-37. A compensation agreement reached at that time, theypoint out, " ' will not bind the beneficiary' if either the trustee failed to make afull disclosure of all circumstances affecting the agreement' " which he knew orshould have known or if the agreement is unfair to the beneficiary. Id., at 23 ( quo-ting Restatement (Second) of Trusts 242, Comment i) . Respondent, on the oth-er hand, contends that the term "fiduciary" is not exclusive to the law of trusts, thatthe phrase means different things in different contexts, and that there is no reason tobelieve that 36 (b) incorporates the specific meaning of the term in the law oftrusts. Brief for Respondent 34-36.
We find it unnecessary to take sides in this dispute. In Pepperv. Litton, 305U. S. 295 (1939), we discussed the meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty in acontext that is analogous to that presented here, and we also looked to trust law. Atissue in Pepperwas whether a bankruptcy court could disallow a dominant or control"ling shareholder's claim for compensation against a bankrupt corporation.
