我國鐵路行業外部資本進入壁壘研究

基本介紹

• 中文名：我國鐵路行業外部資本進入壁壘研究
• 性質：鐵路是國家重要的基礎設施
• 地位：具有舉足輕重
• 意義：通過了《中長期鐵路網規劃》

中文摘要

鐵路是國家重要的基礎設施，在我國綜合交通運輸體系中具有舉足輕重的地位。由於我國幅員遼闊，資源分布和工業布局不平衡；二元經濟結構又導致了大量農村剩餘勞動力從中西部向東部發達省區大跨度流動，這些都需要鐵路這種單位運輸成本低廉、具有中長途運輸優勢的交通工具對能源、材料和人員進行大規模運輸。另外，受我國居民收入水平的限制，以及鐵路在安全、節能、環保方面的優勢，我國鐵路不可能像已開發國家鐵路那樣作為夕陽產業被邊緣化，而是必須加快發展以適應經濟和社會發展的需要。正是基於這樣的認識，2004年國務院審議通過了《中長期鐵路網規劃》，提出了2020年我國鐵路發展的目...>> 詳細

鐵路是國家重要的基礎設施，在我國綜合交通運輸體系中具有舉足輕重的地位。由於我國幅員遼闊，資源分布和工業布局不平衡；二元經濟結構又導致了大量農村剩餘勞動力從中西部向東部發達省區大跨度流動，這些都需要鐵路這種單位運輸成本低廉、具有中長途運輸優勢的交通工具對能源、材料和人員進行大規模運輸。另外，受我國居民收入水平的限制，以及鐵路在安全、節能、環保方面的優勢，我國鐵路不可能像已開發國家鐵路那樣作為夕陽產業被邊緣化，而是必須加快發展以適應經濟和社會發展的需要。正是基於這樣的認識，2004年國務院審議通過了《中長期鐵路網規劃》，提出了2020年我國鐵路發展的目標。加快鐵路投融資體制改革、吸引鐵道部以外的資本參與到鐵路建設中來，是實現這一目標的一項重要舉措。為此，從2005年開始，鐵道部陸續出台了多項政策鼓勵外資和民營資本投入鐵路，但收效甚微。無論是對比其他國家的鐵路，還是我國的其他傳統壟斷性行業，我國鐵路吸引外部資本的努力一直沒有取得理想的效果。因此，研究鐵道部以外的資本進入我國鐵路所面臨的障礙，並找出相應對策，就成為解決我國鐵路投融資體制改革難題的一項迫切要求，具有重大的現實意義。 在傳統的產業組織理論中，進入壁壘是一個重要的研究領域。然而，現有的進入壁壘理論都無法對外部資本進入我國鐵路面臨的障礙這一問題做出比較令人滿意的解釋，究其根本，這顯然涉及到我國鐵路特殊的市場結構以及鐵道部、國鐵與外部資本參與建設的線路之間的複雜關係。因此，本論文的研究也是對現有進入壁壘理論的補充，具有重要的理論意義。 本論文從產業組織的角度理論與實證地研究了外部資本進入我國鐵路所面臨的壁壘及其原因，主要內容有： 首先，論文通過對現有文獻的系統回顧發現，現有的進入壁壘理論、縱向一體化理論中有關一體化企業對競爭對手實施價格與非價格歧視以排擠競爭對手的研究以及網路外部性理論中關於主導廠商與非主導廠商之間競爭關係的研究，都無法對我國鐵路業的外部資本進入壁壘問題做出有充分說服力的解釋，先行者提出的觀點不斷受到後來者的批駁。此外，由於我國鐵路本身所具有的一些獨特性質，迄今為止，國內外學者對於外部資本進入鐵路行業所面臨壁壘問題的研究基本停留在定性化的描述階段，未能利用理論模型對這一問題進行較為深入的分析。因此，如何將目前學術界對鐵路性質的新認識與產業組織理論相結合，從而構建出符合我國鐵路實際狀況的模型，就成了當務之急。 其次，論文對外部資本進入我國鐵路行業的背景與現實狀況進行了研究。我國鐵路對外部資本的需求，是建立在鐵路基本建設所需資金的巨大缺口之上的。一方面，從資金供給方面看，長期以來鐵路基本建設投資所主要依賴的鐵路建設基金、財政撥款和銀行貸款三大渠道有逐年收縮的趨勢。另一方面，從資金需求方面來看，要完成我國鐵路基本建設的重任，達到《中長期鐵路網規劃》的目標，需投入巨額資金。資金供給與需求的巨大缺口，必須也必然要通過動員其他資金來源進行彌補。論文還回顧了鐵道部逐漸放開外部資本進入的過程，並對我國鐵路的產業結構以及鐵道部、國鐵及合資鐵路三者之間的關係進行了深入研究，這是本論文理論研究的基礎。 再次，論文對我國鐵路是否具有規模經濟問題進行了實證分析。長期以來，鐵路一直被認為是一個具有規模經濟效應的行業，這是鐵路在相當長時期內由國家所有，或是由政府對其實行嚴格管制和干預的基本依據。如果確是如此，本論文研究外部資本進入鐵路行業，參與建設與國鐵形成競爭關係的新線路就沒有了理論根據。因為新的經營主體的進入反而降低了行業的效率，使社會福利受到損害。通過實證研究，本論文的結論是我國鐵路並不具有規模經濟，因此鼓勵外部資本參與鐵路建設，形成新的經營主體與國鐵進行競爭就將有利於提高鐵路行業的效率，使鐵路企業能夠以更低的成本提供更優質的鐵路運輸服務。這一結論，為外部資本以企業形式進入鐵路的合理性和必要性提供了理論依據。文章還對外部資本參與鐵路建設的現狀進行了研究，發現作為外部資本參與鐵路建設的主要載體的合資鐵路的營業里程、客貨運量、客貨運周轉量的增長率都呈現出震盪向下的趨勢，這與政府政策上的導向是背離的，從而更加突出了論文研究的必要性。 本論文的核心是，在對我國鐵路行業的結構以及鐵道部、國鐵和合資鐵路三者之間關係進行深入分析的基礎上，建立了一個非價格歧視模型，對外部資本進入我國鐵路行業所面臨的壁壘問題進行了理論研究。結論表明：雖然鐵道部是合資鐵路的出資人之一，但是由於國鐵對合資鐵路實施非價格歧視所得到的收益遠遠大於合資鐵路的損失，總體來說，歧視行為使鐵道部的收益增加了。因此從理性人的角度來說，鐵道部沒有對國鐵的非價格歧視行為進行規制的動力。另外，從整個社會角度來說，非價格歧視行為並沒有使整個社會的運輸量下降，反而有所增加，因此從行業管理部門的角度來講，鐵道部也沒有對國鐵的歧視行為進行規制的動力。再加上合資鐵路的運價波動範圍有限，在遇到非價格歧視時也沒有能力使自身損失最小化。因此，外部資本參與建設的合資鐵路的利益既無法從鐵道部處獲得保障，也無法通過調整價格的方式得到保障，這是外部資本進入面臨的最重要的壁壘。 本論文提出的政策建議有：第一，政企分開，一方面鐵道部將企業職能交給國鐵，自己僅作為行業主管部門承擔行業監管責任，另一方面國鐵將所擁有的對合資鐵路歸口管理的權利交還鐵道部，使國鐵不再具備對合資鐵路實施非價格歧視的條件。第二，結構重組。一方面大力扶持合資鐵路的建設，另一方面對國鐵進行分拆重組，使國鐵與合資鐵路的規模之比小於某一臨界值，從而使兩者之間的競爭達到社會有效。第三，改革鐵路運價形成機制，使無論國鐵還是合資鐵路都能夠根據自身的成本、供求和競爭情況選擇合適的價格，使自身的利潤達到最大化。第四，各項改革共同推進。以吸引外部資本為主要目的的鐵路投融資體制改革必須與政企分離、結構性重組等改革措施共同推進，沒有配套改革的支持，投融資體制改革很可能無果而終。 本論文共分六章論述以上內容。第一章是緒論，提出論文研究的現實與理論意義、論文的研究方法和框架結構。第二章是文獻綜述。第三章分析了鐵路行業外部資本進入的背景並對我國鐵路的產業結構和各利益主體之間的關係進行了研究。第四章是關於我國鐵路行業的規模經濟以及外部資本參建鐵路運營情況的實證分析。第五章是對我國鐵路行業外部資本進入壁壘的理論分析。第六章是結論和政策含義。 關鍵字：鐵路 規模經濟 進入壁壘 非價格歧視

外文摘要

The railway industry is an important infrastructure sector of country, and plays an important role in the comprehensive national transport system. Our country has a vast territory and imbalance between the distribution of resources and the layout of industries. A large number of spare labors flow from the central-west areas to the east provinces because of the dual economic structure. In this case, railway becomes very important because it is a kind of cheap vehicle and has advantages in mediu...>> 詳細

The railway industry is an important infrastructure sector of country, and plays an important role in the comprehensive national transport system. Our country has a vast territory and imbalance between the distribution of resources and the layout of industries. A large number of spare labors flow from the central-west areas to the east provinces because of the dual economic structure. In this case, railway becomes very important because it is a kind of cheap vehicle and has advantages in medium-to long-haul passenger and bulk transport. With the restrict of low revenue and with the characteristics such as security, low consumption of resources and being more environment-friendly, Chinese railway industry is far away from being a sunset industry and still has great potential to develop. Based on such cognition, in 2004 the State Council passed National Middle/Long Term Transport Plans of China, which put forward the goal of Chinese railway in 2020. In order to achieve this goal, the investment reform is very urgent. Begin from 2005, the Ministry of Railways (MOR) has enacted several policies to encourage the foreign capital and civil capital to enter the railway industry. However, these policies had little effect in practise. So it has great realistic significance to research the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. In the industrial organization theory, there are several traditional models on the barrier to entry. Howvever, these models are all not satisfying to explain the barriers in Chinese railway industry exactly. It is obvious that the reason roots in the special market structure of Chinese railway industry and the complicate relationship between MOR, the state railway enterprises and the joint venture railways. So, the research of this dissertation is an important complement to the theory of barriers to entry and has great theoretic significance. This dissertation researches the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry from the angel of industrial organization. The main contents are below: First, the paper reviews the theory of barriers to entry, the price and non-price discrimination theory, the theory of network externalities, the correlative research about the characteristics of railways and some other researches on the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. It is found that each existed theory before cannot explain the barriers to entry of railway industry, especially of Chinese railway industry. The formers' opinions are criticized by the latercomers. Thus, we need to find new methods to research and explain the problem of barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. Second, this dissertation researches the background and status quo of the entry of outside capital in Chinese railway industry. From the view of capital supply, railway construction fund, government's financial allocation and loans of banks are in a decreased trend. It is hard to rely on them to take on the responsibility of railway construction. From the view of capital demand, a large number of funds are needed in order to reach the goal of National Middle/Long Term Transport Plans of China. The huge gap between the supply and demand of the funds must to be met by attracting the funds outside of the MOR in. The paper also reviews the process of opening the door towards the funds outside of the MOR and researches the structure of Chinese railway and the relationship between MOR, the state railway enterprises and the joint venture railways, which is the basis of the theoretic research. Third, as the start point of the research, the paper gives an empirical analysis of scale economy of Chinese railway. The railway has been considered to be of scale of economy, for which the railway was owned by government or regulated strictly by government for a long time. If this kind of consideration is true, the research of our paper would lack the theoretic basis, because the new entity will reduce the efficiency of the industry and harm the social welfare. The empirical analysis shows that Chinese railway is not of scale economy, so it is benefical to encourage the outside funds to participate in the railway construction, which will create a new entity to compete with the state railway enterprises and improve the efficiency of the industry in result. The conclusion of the empirical research provides the essentially theoretical evidence for the entry of the outside funds. The paper also analyzes the status quo of outside funds that participated in the construction of the railway. It is found that the increased ratio of the total route length, passenger traffic, passenger-kilometers, freight traffic, freight ton-kilometers of the joint venture railways are all in a decreased trend, which deviates from the policies of MOR. Last, on the basis of the structure of Chinese railway, the paper establishes a non-price discrimination model for the problem of the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. The conclusion shows that though MOR is one of owners of the joint venture railways, the profit of MOR is not reduced when the state railway enterprises discriminate the joint venture railways with a non-price means, because the getting of non-price discrimination is far more than the losing of joint venture enterprises. As a rational economic man, MOR has no incentives to regulate the non-price discrimination behavior of the state railway enterprises. And from the angel of the whole society, non-price discrimination doesn't cut the traffic down, but increases the traffic, so MOR hasn't incentives to regulate the discrimination behavior of the state railway enterprises from the angel of industrial management department. Furthermore, the fluctuation of the joint venture railway's price is limited, so the joint venture entity cannot minimize its losing when facing the non-price discrimination. The interest of joint venture railways cannot be guaranteed by MOR and by adjusting the price, which are the most important barriers faced by outside funds. In order to cut the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry, several policy advices are given. First is the separation of regulation from operation. On the one hand, MOR would turn in its operation function to the state railway enterprises, manage and supervise the railways as an industrial management department. On the other hand, the state railway enterprises would turn in its supervising right to MOR, then the state railway enterprises would lose the condition to carry on discrimination. Second is the recombination of the industry. On the one hand, we should develop the joint venture railways. On the other hand, the large state railway enterprises would be divided, so that the scale of the joint venture railways and the state railways will be symmetrical. Third is the reform of price formation mechanisms. The state railways and joint venture railways should both have the right to adjust their prices according to the cost, supply and demand, and competition conditions. Fourth is the simultaneousness of starting all the above reforms. The investment reform, the goal of which is to attract the outside funds, must be carried on with the reforms of separation of regulation from operation and of recombination of industry and so on together, or it would be unsuccessful. The dissertation is divided into five parts. Part I is the introduction, which introduces the realistic and theoretic significances of the paper, the research methods and the structure of the dissertation. Par II is the review to relevant literatures and comments. Part III analyzes the background and status quo of the entry of outside funds. Part IV is the empirical analysis to the economy of scale of Chinese railways and the operation of the joint-venture railways. Part V is the theoretic analysis of barriers to entry of Chinese railways. Part VI is the conclusions and policy advices. Keywords: Railway; Scale Economy; Barriers to Entry; Non-price Discrimination