孟娟娟

孟涓涓，現任北京大學光華管理學院套用經濟系和金融系副教授，她在美國加州大學獲得經濟學博士學位。 孟博士目前的研究專長包括行為經濟學，行為金融學，勞動經濟學，發展經濟學等。她的研究成果發表在國外頂級學術期刊上，如American Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of Development Economics, Games and Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.她目前主持國家自然科學基金面上項目“參照點和狹隘視野：行為經濟學前沿問題探究” 和北京青年英才計畫"依賴人際關係還是正式渠道---論正式與非正式制度安排對社會經濟發展的影響"項目研究。曾經主持國家自然科學基金青年基金研究項目 “個體經濟行為中的社會性因素”（已結題）。孟博士曾獲獎項有：光華管理學院最佳新人獎，2007-2008Excellence in Referee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德獎學金等。 孟博士現在北京大學光華管理學院教授中級個體經濟學，高級個體經濟學，行為經濟學和公共財政等課程。

基本介紹

• 中文名：孟涓涓
• 國籍：中國
• 職業：教師
• 畢業院校：美國加州大學

個人履歷

教育背景

2010 加州大學聖迭戈分校 經濟學 博士

2005 北京大學 金融學 學士

職業經歷

2014~至今
北京大學光華管理學院套用經濟系副教授
2010~2014
北京大學光華管理學院套用經濟系助理教授。

所授課程

1. 管理經濟學

2. 高級個體經濟學

研究領域

研究專長包括行為經濟學，行為金融學，勞動經濟學，發展經濟學等。

學術成果

Publications:

With Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income”, American Economic Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and BotondK?szegi and Matthew Rabin’s (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory or reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber’s data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.’s (1997) negative wage elasticity of hours; and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers’ income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.

Working Papers:

“The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point.” revise and resubmit to Journal of Finance

Abstract: The disposition effect refers to the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long. This paper shows that investors’ psychological aversion to losses relative to a reference point predicts the disposition effect when the reference point is defined by expected wealth but not the status quo wealth. Estimates from individual trading records suggest that investors’ reference level of gains is higher than risk-free rate, and it is closely tied to their past average realized gains. Infrequent traders are also shown to have higher reference level and stronger disposition effect than frequent traders. Expectations as reference point provide a simple explanation to these regularities. This theory also has the potential to link expectations to the magnitude of the disposition effect hence market movement.

With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011

Abstract: An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study investigating these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal risk sharing arrangements. This effect is strengthened by ex-ante income inequality and weakened by path dependence of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that the introduction of formal insurance provides better risk coverage when income is equal, but when ex-ante inequality exists, there is no significant risk reduction due to the large crowding-out effect.

"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010

Abstract: Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.

Research in Progress:

"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"

"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"

獲獎情況

2007-2008Excellence in Referee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德獎學金。