《The Theory of Learning in Games》是1998年The MIT Press出版的圖書，作者是Drew Fudenberg、David K. Levine。
基本介紹
- 中文名：The Theory of Learning in Games
- 作者：Drew Fudenberg、David K. Levine
- 出版社：The MIT Press
- 出版時間：1998年5月22日
- 頁數：292 頁
- 裝幀：Hardcover
- ISBN：9780262061940
內容簡介,作者簡介,
內容簡介
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.<br /> <br /> In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
作者簡介
朱·弗登伯格（Drew Fudenberg），哈佛大學經濟系教授。1981年畢業於麻省理工學院，獲得經濟學博士學位。主要研究領域為博弈論和動態經濟學。曾在加州大學伯克利分校、麻省理工學院、史丹福大學和法國土魯斯大學任教。
