基本介紹
- 中文名：國家干預模式、產權性質與組織間網路關係
- 外文名：State intervention model, the nature of property rights and Inter Organizational Networks
- 中圖分類號：C912.3 F069.9
- 關鍵字：產權 市場地位
中文摘要,外文摘要,
中文摘要
【關鍵字】產權 市場地位 國家干預模式 連鎖董事網
本文以連鎖董事網的形成機制為例，考察了國家是如何通過操縱產權活動而塑造商業結構的。連鎖董事網是一種重要的組織間關係網路，它指的是公司的董事同時在兩家或兩家以上的公司兼職而形成的企業間網路。以往對連鎖董事網形成機制的研究，多採取了經濟效率或管理效率的視角，我們稱之為連鎖董事網形成機制研究的市場論流派，主要包括資源依賴理論、監督控制理論、金融控制理論、合謀理論和地理空間機制等。
市場論視角的連鎖董事網形...>> 詳細
本文以連鎖董事網的形成機制為例，考察了國家是如何通過操縱產權活動而塑造商業結構的。連鎖董事網是一種重要的組織間關係網路，它指的是公司的董事同時在兩家或兩家以上的公司兼職而形成的企業間網路。以往對連鎖董事網形成機制的研究，多採取了經濟效率或管理效率的視角，我們稱之為連鎖董事網形成機制研究的市場論流派，主要包括資源依賴理論、監督控制理論、金融控制理論、合謀理論和地理空間機制等。
市場論視角的連鎖董事網形...>> 詳細
【關鍵字】產權 市場地位 國家干預模式 連鎖董事網
【中圖分類號】C912.3 F069.9
本文以連鎖董事網的形成機制為例，考察了國家是如何通過操縱產權活動而塑造商業結構的。連鎖董事網是一種重要的組織間關係網路，它指的是公司的董事同時在兩家或兩家以上的公司兼職而形成的企業間網路。以往對連鎖董事網形成機制的研究，多採取了經濟效率或管理效率的視角，我們稱之為連鎖董事網形成機制研究的市場論流派，主要包括資源依賴理論、監督控制理論、金融控制理論、合謀理論和地理空間機制等。
市場論視角的連鎖董事網形成研究，基本上都忽視了制度性因素在網路形成過程中的重要作用。基於此，我們提出了對中國連鎖董事網形成的制度論的新解釋。我們認為，中國的連鎖董事網主要是國家干預經濟的一種社會結構化表達。非國有企業之間可以按照市場論的邏輯來建立連鎖董事關係，但國有企業之間、以及國有企業和非國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成，卻受到國家干預經濟模式的影響。
20世紀90年代中期以來的經濟改革歷史表明，國家干預經濟的模式已經發生了實質性的變化。國家干預經濟、特別是控制國有資產方面，表現出了一種自上而下的擠壓式干預模式。
國家干預經濟的模式會通過兩條途徑，影響國有企業之間、以及國有企業和非國有企業之間的連鎖董事網形成：第一條途徑是國家通過支配國有產權，在國有企業內部形成了一種政治化的公司治理結構，從而影響了國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成：第二條途徑是國家通過支配國有產權，塑造了具有不平等市場地位的市場結構，從而影響了國有企業和非國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成。
對第一條途徑來說，政治化的公司治理結構之所以有助於國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成，主要是通過兩種制度安排實現的：第一，國有企業中普遍推行外部董事制度；第二，國有企業之間的領導人輪換制度。國家通過這兩種制度安排來維持對國有經濟的絕對控制權，這導致國有企業之間連鎖董事網關係的形成，可能要比非國有企業之間更頻繁。國有產權屬性的公司間形成連鎖董事網是基於政治化的公司治理結構，非國有產權屬性的公司間形成連鎖董事是依據市場邏輯。由此，針對產權屬性相同的公司之間連鎖董事網形成，我們提出了雙重分割理論來進行解釋。
對第二條途徑來說，國家介入經濟的過程，就是塑造市場結構和市場地位的過程。在國家通過自上而下的擠壓式干預而支配產權的前提下，市場上出現了一種不平等的市場地位結構。國家所有或控制的企業受到了更多偏向性的政策支持，因而其市場地位比非國有企業要高，也更可能居於連鎖董事網的核心地位。由此，針對不同產權屬性的公司之間連鎖董事網的形成，我們提出了國家干預下的市場地位理論來進行解釋。
本文的主要貢獻在於兩點：一，通過考察同產權屬性企業間連鎖董事網的形成機制，從經驗層次檢驗了魏昂德(Walder)和倪志偉(Nee)分別提出的中國國有企業政治化的公司治理結構理論；二，通過考察跨產權性質企業間連鎖董事網的形成機制，拓展了波多尼(Podolny)提出的市場地位理論。以上兩點，構成了我們對中國連鎖董事網形成的制度主義社會學分析。
使用2000-2010年中國上市公司的資料、國務院國資委公布的企業領導人任免信息，以及知名財經網站的新聞資料，我們對上述依據制度論提出的相關理論命題進行了實證檢驗。研究結果表明：產權是區分中國企業間連鎖董事網形成的重要維度，受政治化公司治理結構的影響，國有產權屬性的上市公司更可能形成連鎖董事關係；在自上而下的擠壓式干預模式下，國有企業隸屬的行政層級越高，受到的干預就越強，因此也就越可能形成連鎖董事關係；國家干預經濟的模式塑造了市場地位的不平等結構，國有產權屬性的企業通常擁有更高的市場地位，因此也更可能居於連鎖董事網的核心位置。總體而言，我們的研究結果支持了制度論的理論預測；同時，市場論依然具有很強的解釋力。
【中圖分類號】C912.3 F069.9
本文以連鎖董事網的形成機制為例，考察了國家是如何通過操縱產權活動而塑造商業結構的。連鎖董事網是一種重要的組織間關係網路，它指的是公司的董事同時在兩家或兩家以上的公司兼職而形成的企業間網路。以往對連鎖董事網形成機制的研究，多採取了經濟效率或管理效率的視角，我們稱之為連鎖董事網形成機制研究的市場論流派，主要包括資源依賴理論、監督控制理論、金融控制理論、合謀理論和地理空間機制等。
市場論視角的連鎖董事網形成研究，基本上都忽視了制度性因素在網路形成過程中的重要作用。基於此，我們提出了對中國連鎖董事網形成的制度論的新解釋。我們認為，中國的連鎖董事網主要是國家干預經濟的一種社會結構化表達。非國有企業之間可以按照市場論的邏輯來建立連鎖董事關係，但國有企業之間、以及國有企業和非國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成，卻受到國家干預經濟模式的影響。
20世紀90年代中期以來的經濟改革歷史表明，國家干預經濟的模式已經發生了實質性的變化。國家干預經濟、特別是控制國有資產方面，表現出了一種自上而下的擠壓式干預模式。
國家干預經濟的模式會通過兩條途徑，影響國有企業之間、以及國有企業和非國有企業之間的連鎖董事網形成：第一條途徑是國家通過支配國有產權，在國有企業內部形成了一種政治化的公司治理結構，從而影響了國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成：第二條途徑是國家通過支配國有產權，塑造了具有不平等市場地位的市場結構，從而影響了國有企業和非國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成。
對第一條途徑來說，政治化的公司治理結構之所以有助於國有企業之間連鎖董事網的形成，主要是通過兩種制度安排實現的：第一，國有企業中普遍推行外部董事制度；第二，國有企業之間的領導人輪換制度。國家通過這兩種制度安排來維持對國有經濟的絕對控制權，這導致國有企業之間連鎖董事網關係的形成，可能要比非國有企業之間更頻繁。國有產權屬性的公司間形成連鎖董事網是基於政治化的公司治理結構，非國有產權屬性的公司間形成連鎖董事是依據市場邏輯。由此，針對產權屬性相同的公司之間連鎖董事網形成，我們提出了雙重分割理論來進行解釋。
對第二條途徑來說，國家介入經濟的過程，就是塑造市場結構和市場地位的過程。在國家通過自上而下的擠壓式干預而支配產權的前提下，市場上出現了一種不平等的市場地位結構。國家所有或控制的企業受到了更多偏向性的政策支持，因而其市場地位比非國有企業要高，也更可能居於連鎖董事網的核心地位。由此，針對不同產權屬性的公司之間連鎖董事網的形成，我們提出了國家干預下的市場地位理論來進行解釋。
本文的主要貢獻在於兩點：一，通過考察同產權屬性企業間連鎖董事網的形成機制，從經驗層次檢驗了魏昂德(Walder)和倪志偉(Nee)分別提出的中國國有企業政治化的公司治理結構理論；二，通過考察跨產權性質企業間連鎖董事網的形成機制，拓展了波多尼(Podolny)提出的市場地位理論。以上兩點，構成了我們對中國連鎖董事網形成的制度主義社會學分析。
使用2000-2010年中國上市公司的資料、國務院國資委公布的企業領導人任免信息，以及知名財經網站的新聞資料，我們對上述依據制度論提出的相關理論命題進行了實證檢驗。研究結果表明：產權是區分中國企業間連鎖董事網形成的重要維度，受政治化公司治理結構的影響，國有產權屬性的上市公司更可能形成連鎖董事關係；在自上而下的擠壓式干預模式下，國有企業隸屬的行政層級越高，受到的干預就越強，因此也就越可能形成連鎖董事關係；國家干預經濟的模式塑造了市場地位的不平等結構，國有產權屬性的企業通常擁有更高的市場地位，因此也更可能居於連鎖董事網的核心位置。總體而言，我們的研究結果支持了制度論的理論預測；同時，市場論依然具有很強的解釋力。
外文摘要
[Key Words] property rights; market status; the pattern of state intervention; interlocking directorate networks
[Classification No.] C912.3 F069.9
Taking the formation mechanism of interlocking directorates networks as an example, this dissertation investigates how the state constructs market structure by manipulating the property activity. The interlocking directorate networks are very important kind of inter-organizational networks, which are formed by one person that has direct...>> 詳細
[Classification No.] C912.3 F069.9
Taking the formation mechanism of interlocking directorates networks as an example, this dissertation investigates how the state constructs market structure by manipulating the property activity. The interlocking directorate networks are very important kind of inter-organizational networks, which are formed by one person that has direct...>> 詳細
[Key Words] property rights; market status; the pattern of state intervention; interlocking directorate networks
[Classification No.] C912.3 F069.9
Taking the formation mechanism of interlocking directorates networks as an example, this dissertation investigates how the state constructs market structure by manipulating the property activity. The interlocking directorate networks are very important kind of inter-organizational networks, which are formed by one person that has directorship at two or more firms simultaneously. The literature, which focuses on the formation of interlocking directorates networks, usually takes the perspective of economic or management efficiency. We called this wave of research market theory. The market theory has several mainstream viewpoints that include resources dependency theory, monitoring and controlling theory, financial control theory, collusion theory, and geography and space mechanism.
The market theory usually omits the key role of institutional elements in the process of forming the interlocking networks. Based on this argument, we propose an institutional theory to explain the networks formation. We argue that Chinese interlocking networks, which represent the social structure, are configured by the state intervention. The network formation of non-SOE follows the market logic, while the SOE-SOE''s and SOE-non-SOE''s network formation are interfered by the state.
Since the mid-1990s, the history of economic reform shows that the pattern of state intervention changed substantially. The state intervention, especially the regulation of state assets, changed into a new pattern of top-down squeezing intervention.
The new pattern of state intervention will influence SOE-SOE''s and SOE-non-SOE''s network formation tlirough two ways: firstly, state control the governance structure of SOE by dominating state property rights, which forms a special structure named political corporate governance structure, and this will influence the formation of SOE-SOE''s interlocking networks; Secondly, the new pattern of state intervention configures the market structure, in which many firms have unequal market status, this will influence the formation of SOE-non-SOE''s interlocking networks.
To the first path aforementioned, the political corporate governance structure is likely to form interlocking networks between SOEs, because there are two kinds of institutional arrangements enforce it. First of all, state popularizes the outside director system among SOEs. Secondly, state promotes the leaders of SOEs exchange system among SOEs. Based on these two kinds of institutional arrangements, the state maintains the absolute dominance of the national economy. This leads to the SOE-SOE''s formation of interlocking networks is more frequent than non-SOE-non-SOE''s. The logic of SOE-SOE''s formation of interlocking networks is based on the political corporate governance structure, while non-SOE-non-SOE''s is based on market theory. According to these arguments, we propose a dual divides theory to interpret the formation of interlocking networks between firms which have the same property rights.
To the second path, state interferes the economy implies it configures the market structure and market status as well. Because the party-state dominates state property rights by the pattern of top-down squeezing intervention, there is an unequal market status in the market. Since SOEs gain much preferential policy treatment from the state, they have higher market status than those non-SOEs, and they are at the central place of the interlocking networks. According to these arguments, we propose a state intervention-based market status theory to interpret the formation of interlocking networks between firms which have different property rights.
This dissertation has two main contributions: Firstly, by investigating the formation mechanisms of interlocking networks between firms that have the same property rights, we provide empirical tests to the abstract concept named political corporate governance structure, which was presented by Walder and Nee independently; Secondly, by investigating the formation mechanisms of interlocking networks between firms that have different property rights, we extend the market status theory that first proposed by Podolny. These two arguments jointly illustrate the institutional logic of formation mechanism of Chinese interlocking networks.
Using the listed company data in China within 2000-2010, the appointment and removal information about SOE leaders disclosed by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), and the news publicized by famous economic websites in China, we test those predictions of institutional theory aforementioned. The results show that: the property right is a critical dimension to demarcate interlocking networks in China, and SOEs are much more likely to form interlocking networks with each other because of the influence of the political corporate governance structure; under the condition of top-down squeezing state intervention, the higher hierarchy of the government that SOEs affiliated to, SOEs will be intervened more strongly, and they will have higher probability to form interlocking networks; the pattern of state intervention configures the unequal market status, since SOEs always have higher market status, they may have higher probability to posit the central place of the interlocking networks. Overall, our research supports the institutional theory''s predictions; however, market theory still has strong power of explanation.
[Classification No.] C912.3 F069.9
Taking the formation mechanism of interlocking directorates networks as an example, this dissertation investigates how the state constructs market structure by manipulating the property activity. The interlocking directorate networks are very important kind of inter-organizational networks, which are formed by one person that has directorship at two or more firms simultaneously. The literature, which focuses on the formation of interlocking directorates networks, usually takes the perspective of economic or management efficiency. We called this wave of research market theory. The market theory has several mainstream viewpoints that include resources dependency theory, monitoring and controlling theory, financial control theory, collusion theory, and geography and space mechanism.
The market theory usually omits the key role of institutional elements in the process of forming the interlocking networks. Based on this argument, we propose an institutional theory to explain the networks formation. We argue that Chinese interlocking networks, which represent the social structure, are configured by the state intervention. The network formation of non-SOE follows the market logic, while the SOE-SOE''s and SOE-non-SOE''s network formation are interfered by the state.
Since the mid-1990s, the history of economic reform shows that the pattern of state intervention changed substantially. The state intervention, especially the regulation of state assets, changed into a new pattern of top-down squeezing intervention.
The new pattern of state intervention will influence SOE-SOE''s and SOE-non-SOE''s network formation tlirough two ways: firstly, state control the governance structure of SOE by dominating state property rights, which forms a special structure named political corporate governance structure, and this will influence the formation of SOE-SOE''s interlocking networks; Secondly, the new pattern of state intervention configures the market structure, in which many firms have unequal market status, this will influence the formation of SOE-non-SOE''s interlocking networks.
To the first path aforementioned, the political corporate governance structure is likely to form interlocking networks between SOEs, because there are two kinds of institutional arrangements enforce it. First of all, state popularizes the outside director system among SOEs. Secondly, state promotes the leaders of SOEs exchange system among SOEs. Based on these two kinds of institutional arrangements, the state maintains the absolute dominance of the national economy. This leads to the SOE-SOE''s formation of interlocking networks is more frequent than non-SOE-non-SOE''s. The logic of SOE-SOE''s formation of interlocking networks is based on the political corporate governance structure, while non-SOE-non-SOE''s is based on market theory. According to these arguments, we propose a dual divides theory to interpret the formation of interlocking networks between firms which have the same property rights.
To the second path, state interferes the economy implies it configures the market structure and market status as well. Because the party-state dominates state property rights by the pattern of top-down squeezing intervention, there is an unequal market status in the market. Since SOEs gain much preferential policy treatment from the state, they have higher market status than those non-SOEs, and they are at the central place of the interlocking networks. According to these arguments, we propose a state intervention-based market status theory to interpret the formation of interlocking networks between firms which have different property rights.
This dissertation has two main contributions: Firstly, by investigating the formation mechanisms of interlocking networks between firms that have the same property rights, we provide empirical tests to the abstract concept named political corporate governance structure, which was presented by Walder and Nee independently; Secondly, by investigating the formation mechanisms of interlocking networks between firms that have different property rights, we extend the market status theory that first proposed by Podolny. These two arguments jointly illustrate the institutional logic of formation mechanism of Chinese interlocking networks.
Using the listed company data in China within 2000-2010, the appointment and removal information about SOE leaders disclosed by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), and the news publicized by famous economic websites in China, we test those predictions of institutional theory aforementioned. The results show that: the property right is a critical dimension to demarcate interlocking networks in China, and SOEs are much more likely to form interlocking networks with each other because of the influence of the political corporate governance structure; under the condition of top-down squeezing state intervention, the higher hierarchy of the government that SOEs affiliated to, SOEs will be intervened more strongly, and they will have higher probability to form interlocking networks; the pattern of state intervention configures the unequal market status, since SOEs always have higher market status, they may have higher probability to posit the central place of the interlocking networks. Overall, our research supports the institutional theory''s predictions; however, market theory still has strong power of explanation.
