《公司法基礎》是2005年法律出版社出版的圖書，作者是羅伯塔·羅曼諾。
基本介紹
- 書名：公司法基礎
- 作者：羅伯塔·羅曼諾 編
- ISBN：9787503653070
- 頁數：319
- 定價：45.00元
- 出版社：法律出版
- 出版時間：2005-3
內容簡介,目錄,
內容簡介
這十年經歷了一場公司法革命。在這不同尋常的十年期間，業界創新了商業組織結構和兼併行為模式，而公司法領域的理論也由於引進了經濟學的組織理論和現代公司金融理論等分析方法而大為改觀。這種對經濟學理論的融合深刻影響了公司運作方式以及公司法教學，而這種影響將持續下去。這本論文集著重介紹了公司法領域迥然對立的各種理論，以及這些理論得以產生的經濟學基本原理。此外，我們通過提供公司治理方面廣泛而繁茂的實證研究成果，努力用寫實的手法給學子們描繪出對他們而言很陌生的公司法研究概況。
因阿道夫·伯利和加德納·米恩斯二人對所有權和經營權分離帶來的問題之深刻分析，公眾持股公司的重要特點變得明晰：公司經營業務的經理層並不擁有該公司。伯利和米恩斯認為這種分離產生了許多組織上的弊端，因為公司所有人的利益並不總是與經理層一致。這類問題被稱為代理問題。正如這本論文集所闡釋的，公司法的大部分內容就是在探討如何處理代理問題。本書收集的論文運用經濟學組織理論和公司金融理論從不同角度對這一問題展開剖析，並分別提出了不同的解決方案。
我本人曾在公司法和公司金融等課堂上使用本書中的材料。編輯本書時我們有意將其做成供學生在公司法課堂討論的教材，同時，體例上我們在每一章節安排了要點與問題，以便讀者能獨立閱讀並自我指導。論文均經過多方面編輯加工，使其更好用。我們將初稿里的數學計算和公式進行了壓縮，但要點裡的數據原封不動，以闡釋某些概念。當然這種做法很危險，因為失卻了學術著述的複雜性，而且留給人一種錯誤的印象，即創建一個理論不會引起理解上的歧義。為儘量避免這種誤識，我有意將觀點大相逕庭的相關論文及隨後的要點並列編排在一起。此外，論文節錄中的參考書目和腳註均已省去——為增強可讀性和更適合教學，只好犧牲各論文節錄的精確性和查閱引文出處的便捷性了。讀者若對節錄感興趣，可以查找原論文。
目錄
ⅠTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets,1
A.TheoryoftheFirm,4
TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency
Costs,and
OwnershipStructure,4
MichaelC.JensenandWilliamH.Meckling
TransactionCostEconomics,9
OliverE.Williamson
OwnershipoftheFirm,15
HenryHansmann
NotesandQuestions,22
B.TheoryofCapitalMarkets,26
FromARandomWalkDownWallStreet,26
BurtonG.Malkiel
FromCorporateFinance,43
StephenA.Ross,RandolphW.Westerfield,and
JeffreyF.Jaffe
NotesandQuestions,57
ⅡLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:Limited
Liability,61
LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,62
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
LimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirm,70
SusanE.Woodward
TowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityfor
Corporate
Torts,73
HenryHansmannandReinierKraakman
NotesandQuestions,78
ⅢTheProductionofCorporationLaws,82
A.StateCompetitionforCorporateCharters,84
TheStateCompetitionDebateinCorporateLaw,84
RobertaRomano
TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelaware
Corporate
Law,90
JonathanR.MaceyandGeoffreyP.Miller
NotesandQuestions,93
B.TheStructureofCorporationLaws,96
TheCorporateContract,96
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLaw,104
JeffreyN.Gordon
TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:An
Essay
ontheJudicialRole,111
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.
NotesandQuestions,113
ⅣFinancingtheCorporation,119
OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBond
Covenants,121
CliffordW.Smith,Jr.,andJeroldB.Warner
ContractualResolutionofBondholder－Stockholder
Conflicts
inLeveragedBuyouts,128
KennethLehnandAnnettePoulsen
ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof
Bankruptcy,130
MichaelC.Jensen
TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapital
Organizations,132
WilliamA.Sahlman
TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,138
FrankH.Easterbrook
NotesandQuestions,140
ⅤInternalGovernanceStructures,146
A.BoardsofDirectorsandFiduciaryDuties,148
CorporateGovernance,148
OliverE.Williamson
IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensation
Plans,155
CliffordW.Smith,Jr.andRossL.Watts
TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithout
Foundation?,162
RobertaRomano
Does"Unlawful"Mean"Criminal"?:Reflectionson
the
DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmerican
Law,173
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,
NotesandQuestions,179
B.ShareholderVotingRightsandtheExerciseof
Voice,187
VotinginCorporateLaw,187
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandthe
Problemof
ShareholderChoice,192
JeffreyN.Gordon
ProxyContestsandtheEfficiencyofShareholder
Oversight,197
JohnPound
APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,
206
MarkJ.Roe
AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseof
Institutional
InvestorVoice,210
BernardS.Black
ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof
Bankruptcy,
213
MichaelC.Jensen
NotesandQuestions,214
ⅥExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketfor
Corporate
Control,221
A.TheoriesandEvidence,223
MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,223
HenryG.Manne
Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,225
MichaelC.Jensen
BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,228
AndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers
RiskReductionasaManagerialMotivefor
Conglomerate
Mergers,232
YakovAmihudandBaruchLev
TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,233
RichardRoll
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientific
Evidence,235
MichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical
Evidence
Since1980,242
GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry
M.Netter
HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturnto
Corporate
Specialization,245
SanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleifer,andRobertW.
Vishny
NotesandQuestions,248
B.Management’sFiduciaryDutyandTakeover
Defenses,258
TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementin
Respondingtoa
TenderOffer,258
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
SeekingCompetitiveBidsVersusPurePassivityin
Tender
OfferDefense,262
RonaldJ.Gilson
TheCaseforFacilitatingCompetingTenderOffers:
AReply
andExtension,265
LucianA.Bebchuk
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical
Evidence
Since1980,267
GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry
M.Netter
TheWealthEffectsofSecond-GenerationState
Takeover
Legislation,272
JonathanM.KarpoffandPaulH.Malatesta
TheFutureofHostileTakeovers:Legislationand
Public
Opinion,278
RobertaRomano
NotesandQuestions,285
ⅦSecuritiesRegulation,293
A.DisclosureRegulation,295
MandatoryDisclosureandtheProtectionof
Investors,295
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
MarketFailureandtheEconomicCasefora
Mandatory
DisclosureSystem,301
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.
TheEffectofthe1933SecuritiesActonInvestor
Information
andthePerformanceofNewIssues,303
CarolJ.Simon
NotesandQuestions,305
B.InsiderTradingRegulation,310
InsiderTrading:Rule10b-5,Disclosure,and
Corporate
Privacy,310
KennethE.Scott
TheRegulationofInsiderTrading,313
DennisW.CarltonandDanielR.Fischel
NotesandQuestions,317
TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency
Costs,and
OwnershipStructure,4
MichaelC.JensenandWilliamH.Meckling
TransactionCostEconomics,9
OliverE.Williamson
OwnershipoftheFirm,15
HenryHansmann
NotesandQuestions,22
B.TheoryofCapitalMarkets,26
FromARandomWalkDownWallStreet,26
BurtonG.Malkiel
FromCorporateFinance,43
StephenA.Ross,RandolphW.Westerfield,and
JeffreyF.Jaffe
NotesandQuestions,57
ⅡLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:Limited
Liability,61
LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,62
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
LimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirm,70
SusanE.Woodward
TowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityfor
Corporate
Torts,73
HenryHansmannandReinierKraakman
NotesandQuestions,78
ⅢTheProductionofCorporationLaws,82
A.StateCompetitionforCorporateCharters,84
TheStateCompetitionDebateinCorporateLaw,84
RobertaRomano
TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelaware
Corporate
Law,90
JonathanR.MaceyandGeoffreyP.Miller
NotesandQuestions,93
B.TheStructureofCorporationLaws,96
TheCorporateContract,96
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLaw,104
JeffreyN.Gordon
TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:An
Essay
ontheJudicialRole,111
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.
NotesandQuestions,113
ⅣFinancingtheCorporation,119
OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBond
Covenants,121
CliffordW.Smith,Jr.,andJeroldB.Warner
ContractualResolutionofBondholder－Stockholder
Conflicts
inLeveragedBuyouts,128
KennethLehnandAnnettePoulsen
ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof
Bankruptcy,130
MichaelC.Jensen
TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapital
Organizations,132
WilliamA.Sahlman
TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,138
FrankH.Easterbrook
NotesandQuestions,140
ⅤInternalGovernanceStructures,146
A.BoardsofDirectorsandFiduciaryDuties,148
CorporateGovernance,148
OliverE.Williamson
IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensation
Plans,155
CliffordW.Smith,Jr.andRossL.Watts
TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithout
Foundation?,162
RobertaRomano
Does"Unlawful"Mean"Criminal"?:Reflectionson
the
DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmerican
Law,173
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,
NotesandQuestions,179
B.ShareholderVotingRightsandtheExerciseof
Voice,187
VotinginCorporateLaw,187
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandthe
Problemof
ShareholderChoice,192
JeffreyN.Gordon
ProxyContestsandtheEfficiencyofShareholder
Oversight,197
JohnPound
APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,
206
MarkJ.Roe
AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseof
Institutional
InvestorVoice,210
BernardS.Black
ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof
Bankruptcy,
213
MichaelC.Jensen
NotesandQuestions,214
ⅥExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketfor
Corporate
Control,221
A.TheoriesandEvidence,223
MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,223
HenryG.Manne
Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,225
MichaelC.Jensen
BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,228
AndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers
RiskReductionasaManagerialMotivefor
Conglomerate
Mergers,232
YakovAmihudandBaruchLev
TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,233
RichardRoll
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientific
Evidence,235
MichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical
Evidence
Since1980,242
GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry
M.Netter
HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturnto
Corporate
Specialization,245
SanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleifer,andRobertW.
Vishny
NotesandQuestions,248
B.Management’sFiduciaryDutyandTakeover
Defenses,258
TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementin
Respondingtoa
TenderOffer,258
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
SeekingCompetitiveBidsVersusPurePassivityin
Tender
OfferDefense,262
RonaldJ.Gilson
TheCaseforFacilitatingCompetingTenderOffers:
AReply
andExtension,265
LucianA.Bebchuk
TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical
Evidence
Since1980,267
GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry
M.Netter
TheWealthEffectsofSecond-GenerationState
Takeover
Legislation,272
JonathanM.KarpoffandPaulH.Malatesta
TheFutureofHostileTakeovers:Legislationand
Public
Opinion,278
RobertaRomano
NotesandQuestions,285
ⅦSecuritiesRegulation,293
A.DisclosureRegulation,295
MandatoryDisclosureandtheProtectionof
Investors,295
FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel
MarketFailureandtheEconomicCasefora
Mandatory
DisclosureSystem,301
JohnC.Coffee,Jr.
TheEffectofthe1933SecuritiesActonInvestor
Information
andthePerformanceofNewIssues,303
CarolJ.Simon
NotesandQuestions,305
B.InsiderTradingRegulation,310
InsiderTrading:Rule10b-5,Disclosure,and
Corporate
Privacy,310
KennethE.Scott
TheRegulationofInsiderTrading,313
DennisW.CarltonandDanielR.Fischel
NotesandQuestions,317
