在當前我國聯營體模式的電力市場中，如何防範和抑制發電廠商的市場力量。本文通過實證分析，發現了我國電力市場中存在發電廠商施用市場力量的跡象。本文對於防範發電廠商市場力量的建議是，在供給側實施差別價格拍賣並在需求側實施可中斷負荷服務。 電力產業曾被認為是一個典型的自然壟斷產業，維持了一百餘年的發電、輸電、配電和售電一體化的模式。上世紀九十年代以來，以英國為發端，出現了一個世界性的電力產業拆分與重組的浪潮，我國也於2002年末實現了“廠網分開”。
基本介紹
- 中文名：中國電力產業廠商市場力量的防範研究
- 類型：防範研究
- 視角：產業組織理論
- 研究市場：電力市場
中文摘要,外文摘要,
中文摘要
本文是一篇從產業組織理論的視角分析電力產業市場化改革問題的嘗試之作。本文的主題是，在當前我國聯營體模式的電力市場中，如何防範和抑制發電廠商的市場力量。本文通過實證分析，發現了我國電力市場中存在發電廠商施用市場力量的跡象。本文對於防範發電廠商市場力量的建議是，在供給側實施差別價格拍賣並在需求側實施可中斷負荷服務。 電力產業曾被認為是一個典型的自然壟斷產業，維持了一百餘年的發電、輸電、配電和售電一體化的模式。上世紀九十年代以來，以英國為發端，出現了一個世界性的電力產業拆分與重組的浪潮，我國也於2002年末實現了“廠網分開”。然而電力市場並非是自...>> 詳細
本文是一篇從產業組織理論的視角分析電力產業市場化改革問題的嘗試之作。本文的主題是，在當前我國聯營體模式的電力市場中，如何防範和抑制發電廠商的市場力量。本文通過實證分析，發現了我國電力市場中存在發電廠商施用市場力量的跡象。本文對於防範發電廠商市場力量的建議是，在供給側實施差別價格拍賣並在需求側實施可中斷負荷服務。 電力產業曾被認為是一個典型的自然壟斷產業，維持了一百餘年的發電、輸電、配電和售電一體化的模式。上世紀九十年代以來，以英國為發端，出現了一個世界性的電力產業拆分與重組的浪潮，我國也於2002年末實現了“廠網分開”。然而電力市場並非是自發演進形成的，而是一個人工設計的市場，其運營規則和競價機制難免存在這樣或那樣的紕漏。面對市場的疏漏、受到利益的驅使，從原一體化結構中剝離出來的獨立的發電廠商，一定會最大限度地掘取潛在的利潤。電力產業市場化的歷程表明，各國的電力市場幾乎都遇到了由發電廠商的市場力量所引發的電價波動的困擾。市場力量的行使不僅損害消費者的利益，同時還將危害電力市場的正常運行與健康發展，美國加州的電力危機就是一個很好的例證。由於新組建的電力市場特別容易受到市場力量的襲擾，一些西方學者將其列為電力市場的頭號治理對象。 我國經濟學界對電力市場的研究到目前仍處於起步階段，已有的分析都未能很好地結合電力產業的特性。作為一篇嘗試之作，本文首先分析了電力產業的一些獨有技術特徵，如負荷具有不確定性、電力傳輸會受到線路容量的限制、存在短期的供給約束等。基於對這些技術特徵的理解，通過理論借鑑與本文的實證，筆者發現不同於傳統的產業組織理論中市場力量的觀念，電力市場中的發電廠商並非自始至終地都在行使市場力量來抬高電價，它們行使市場力量需要一個適合的供需環境。憑藉市場力量抬高電價的手法主要有兩類：一是向聯營體直接申報高價，二是採取容量囤積的策略。而無論發電廠商採取何種策略，都將造成電價的巨幅波動，這是發電廠商獲取超額利潤的載體。本文的實證分析表明，與其它一些初級電力市場類似，我國的試點市場中也存在發電廠商申報高價和囤積容量的現象。 由於電價的巨幅波動是超額利潤的載體，同時躉售市場規則的紕漏有可能導致市場力量的濫用，因此，筆者將分析的重點集中於市場規則、需求彈性和市場結構等三個方面。實際上本文抑制市場力量的出發點，就是在市場設計中儘量減少可能導致價格巨幅波動的那些因素。 已有的拍賣研究成果顯示，在不同的拍賣方式下價格的波動幅度是不相同的。受此啟發，筆者在第五章通過對兩種拍賣方式下供給函式的推導與對比分析，發現差別價格拍賣的供給曲線具有較高的價格彈性，因而筆者認為，在供給側將目前的統一價格拍賣轉換為差別價格拍賣將有助於抑制發電廠商的市場力量。 電力需求的價格彈性過低，是發電廠商擁有市場力量的一個重要方面。一旦在需求側建立起回響定價，發電側的價格尖峰就可以及時地傳遞給消費者，這將使用戶的需求得到抑制，從而削弱發電廠商行使市場力量的激勵。但由於需求側回響定價的實施首先應當有一個完善的峰谷電價體系平台，而目前我國的零售電價體系與一個科學的電價制度還相差甚遠，同時還面臨一個激勵兩難，因此應當考慮其它的方式來增加需求曲線的彈性。本文證明，在需求側實施可中斷負荷服務，可以增加需求曲線的價格彈性，起到與需求側實時電價同樣的抑制發電廠商市場力量的效果。而可中斷負荷服務又避免了上面提到的缺陷，因而是一個非常理想的替代方案。 本文在對電力市場的空間把握與市場集中度的度量方面，以及在對發電廠商的容量囤積策略的實證等方面具有創新性的貢獻。本文的不足之處在於數理模型和計量工具的運用還不夠深入。此外，由於各公司對數據的封鎖，沒有獲得一些更加核心的信息。 電力市場是一個新生事物，直至目前世界各國仍處於探索和完善的階段。就當前我國的具體國情來分析，對聯營體中市場力量的防範除了供給側和需求側兩方面的措施外，還需要多種措施的配合，如繼續拆分發電廠商、在長期中擴充發電裝機容量與輸電能力，以及行之有效的規制等。 [關鍵字]產業組織 市場力量 電力市場 拍賣 [中圖分類號]F426．
外文摘要
This dissertation tries to discuss some of the main issues of the power market-oriented reform in a framework of the industrial organization theory. The main objective of this dissertation is to find how to mitigate market power in the electricity power pool in our country. Through an empirical study we find some evidences of exercising market power by some of the generators in China. This dissertation gives some advices on preventing market power, including discriminatory price auction on sup...>> 詳細
This dissertation tries to discuss some of the main issues of the power market-oriented reform in a framework of the industrial organization theory. The main objective of this dissertation is to find how to mitigate market power in the electricity power pool in our country. Through an empirical study we find some evidences of exercising market power by some of the generators in China. This dissertation gives some advices on preventing market power, including discriminatory price auction on supply side and interruptible services on demand side. Traditionally, the electric power industry has been regarded as a natural monopoly with generation, transmission and distribution integrated vertically well for 100 years. Since 1990, beginning in the U.K., there is a worldwide trend of restructuring in the electric power industry. China also unbundled its generation sector from the grid in 2002. However, the power market is not a direct result of independent actions by generators, distributors and customers, but an artificial market of a deliberate government policy. For this reason, oversights are hard to avoid in the market rules governing the operation. Prompted by profits, the independent producers separated from the vertically structure will attempt to exploit any profitable opportunities presented by the market rules. The course of the power market-oriented reform shows that high prices caused by the market power of the producers emerged in almost all areas after the supply side separated from the network. The Californian electricity crisis provides a stark evidence that market power will jeopardize the interest of the customers and impair power markets. Susceptible to the exercise of market power in the new power markets, mitigating them is therefore high on the agenda for regulators by some western scholars' consideration. In our economics academic circles, power market is pending for further research. Many literatures can hardly discuss market power in the light of specific technologies. This dissertation tries to combine some characteristic such as system load indetermination, transmission capacity limitation and short-run generation constraints into the analyses. Based on the technique analysis and an empirical study, we find that generators in a power market are not exercising their market power all the time, as is different from the classic IO theory. When conditions exogenous to the behavior of the generators favor it, they will abuse their potential market power. Generators have two strategic weapons to exercise their market power: (1) the price bid for each generation set and (2) the capacity for each generation set made available to supply the market. Our empirical study shows that bidding and withholding strategy both can be found in our pilot power market, as is similar to the foreign markets. Market rules, market structure, and elasticity of demand are the important features of the power Pool which contribute to the ability of generators to abuse market power, so we focus on these factors in our analyses. In fact, the starting point of this dissertation is to minimize those market rules that can bring out wholesale price spikes. Auction studies suggest that price volatilities are differences between the uniform price auction and discriminatory price auction. Following their suggestion, we compare two supply functions using a uniform price and a discriminatory price auction for an electricity market, and find that the supply curves will typically be more price elastic using a DPA than UPA. Therefore, DPA is a better form for a power market to control the market power. Another source of generators' market power is the low elasticity of the demand side. Responsive pricing can dampen the incentive of excising market power because price spikes in the wholesale market can curb the customs' demand in time. However, responsive pricing needs a basis of complete peak-load pricing system. In our country, there is a long way for a reasonable retail price system to be achieved, and there is a incentive dilemma of the responsive pricing, so we should considering some other way to enhance the demand side elasticity. This dissertation shows that interruptible load service has the same effect as responsive pricing in building an elastic demand side and mitigating market power. However, interruptible load service avoids those shortcomings mentioned above, so it is an ideal scheme. This dissertation brings some original ideas on defining the range and measuring the concentration of the power market, and creates a new approach to study empirically of the capacity withholding strategy. There are some inadequacies in our analysis such as a plain model and simple econometric methods. Furthermore, we can't get some core data because of the hard blockade of the information in the electric power industry in our country. Power market is still in its initial stage, and the market rules and structures still need to be investigated and improved. According to our national conditions, we should adopt various measures to prevent market power including newly installed capacity investments, transmission expansion and an effective regulation, besides methods mentioned above. 【Keywords】 industrial organization market power electricity markets auction 【CLC】 F426.61
